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in government? The board interlock network served as a reliable map of power for most of the 20th 
century. With the decline of the interlock network over the last few decades, we are left without a reliable 
map of corporate power, leading to a theory of a fractured corporate elite that is ineffectual in its 
collective policy influence. 
In this article, we argue that the fractured elite thesis overlooks two factors that counteract the decline of 
the domestic interlock network- a stable inner circle of highly connected individuals and a growing policy 
planning network (PPN). Using network data from 2010-11 on both board of director and corporate-policy 
planning org interlocks, along with a plethora of data on corporate political behavior, we demonstrate that 
the inner circle is still the primary organizing group of the capitalist class, and that the PPN is its current 
organizational vehicle. We demonstrate that the PPN is a primary source of political mobilization and 
cohesion, and is thus a source of continued corporate dominance. Ultimately we argue that the PPN can 
be used as a map to guide our understanding of the relationship between business and politics. 
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Introduction 
 
Donald Trump campaigned against the close ties of the political and 
corporate elite, claiming he knew how the system worked because he took 
advantage of it1, and that he would use this knowledge to “drain the swamp” and 
root out the corrupting influence of corporate lobbyists2.  Now that he is President, 
Trump has designated a collection of corporate CEOs and billionaires as his main 
advisors3 and potential cabinet appointees4. What do we make of this? Will Trump 
still oppose international trade deals and stand up to Wall Street fraud? What sorts 
of policies can we expect, based on the advisors and cabinet officials surrounding 
Trump? In order to answer questions like these, we need to know what interests the 
corporate elites surrounding Trump represent. Do they know each other and share 
interests and policy prescriptions, or are they independent representatives of their 
firms and industries? This is the goal of power structure research in the field of 
political sociology- to trace a map of power and influence that can be used to 
identify key political actors and the interests behind their actions.  
 
 Power structure research assumes that societal power is rooted in large 
organizations and that the structure of power in a society is determined by the 
connections between the leaders of these organizations5. For corporate power this 
has usually meant studying the structure created by shared directors – the board 
interlock network (Mizruchi, 1996; Chu and Davis, 2016). This method would 
have, in the past, answered the above questions regarding Trump’s advisors and 
cabinet picks by examining the corporate organizations that his appointees are 
affiliated with and then finding the position of those organizations in the larger 
interlock network. If the individuals are found at the center of the intercorporate 
network we might infer that they represent a more general class-wide business 
interest due to one of the network’s functions being a system of communication 
where those at the center have access to information from all sectors of the 
corporate world (Useem, 1984: 53-55; Mintz and Schwartz, 1985: 134-36). Of 
course, the reverse of this, is that the appointee is from the periphery of the network, 
which would suggest policies geared around the narrow benefit of the company and 
industry the individual is affiliated with. 
 
1 http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trumps-surprisingly-honest-lessons-big-money-
politics/story?id=32993736 
2 https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/trump-pledges-to-drain-the-swamp 
3 http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/donald-trump-announces-advisory-committee-big-
ceos/story?id=43930895 
4 https://news.vice.com/story/the-millionaires-and-billionaires-in-trumps-cabinet-will-get-an-
exclusive-tax-benefit 
5 http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/methods/power_structure_research.html 
 The problem with an interlock analysis is that the macro features of the 
network have changed drastically in the last 30 years- commercial banks 
disappeared from the center of the network (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999) and since 
the year 2000, the network itself has become much more sparse and disconnected 
(Chu and Davis, 2016). This has led to the conclusion that the interlock network is 
no longer able to diffuse class-wide rationality to the corporate elite, making the 
interlock network a poor map of corporate power. This has also lead some scholars 
to infer that in the absence of a functioning interlock network, the corporate elite 
are fractured by narrow sectoral interest (Mizruchi, 2013; Waterhouse, 2104; Chu 
and Davis, 2016).  
 
If we were to evaluate Trump’s economic advisory group under the 
framework of the fractured elite thesis, each individual’s position in the 
intercorporate network would be unimportant. Instead, we would assume each 
represented the interests of their own company and industry. Of course, the 
fractured elite analysis may be incorrect if the interlock network is not the center of 
the corporate power structure. For instance, Chu and Davis (2016: 751) raise the 
possibility that “the social elite still coheres but has found new, more hospitable 
enclaves, protected from non-elite entry and hidden from public scrutiny”, and note 
the evidence of a “more global corporate elite that spans national boundaries.” In 
addition, Domhoff (2015) explicitly argues for the importance of the policy 
planning network in a critique of the fractured elite thesis. 
 
In this article, we will argue that the corporate elite do have a different 
enclave, but it is not hidden from public scrutiny- it is the giant institutional 
apparatus of policy discussion groups, think tanks, and corporate foundations that 
make up what Domhoff (2014; 2015) refers to as the policy planning network 
(PPN). That is, we will argue that the fractured elite thesis overlooks two factors 
that counteract the decline of the domestic interlock network- a growing PPN and 
a stable inner circle. Using network data from 2010-11 on both board of director 
and corporate-policy planning org interlocks, we demonstrate that the inner circle 
(Useem, 1984) is still the primary organizing group/leading edge of the capitalist 
class, and that the PPN is its current organizational vehicle. As the organizational 
vehicle of class-wide action, the PPN can also serve as a new map of corporate 
class-wide interests and power. Ultimately, what we will argue in this paper is that 
scholarship needs to move beyond the domestic board interlock network in order 
to truly grasp the corporate power structure and understand the players and interests 
involved in shaping government policy. 
 
 
 
Corporate Networks as Maps of Political Power 
 
In order for a given corporate network to serve as a map of power, we must be able 
to infer interests and patterns of behavior from network position. That is, the 
political activity and interests of a corporate actor cannot solely be shaped by their 
individual economic interests, they must also be shaped by the network. For 
example, those who have many ties and are central must behave differently, have 
more power, and have a different understanding of their interests, than those that 
have few ties and are peripheral. In other words, centrality in the network should 
be associated with a shared understanding of interests that brings political cohesion 
(the power of solidarity) and greater political activity (the power of direct action). 
 
If the above is true, then the corporate network can serve as a guide to 
understanding corporate power and political action. That is, on any given corporate 
political action, we can determine whether it is likely that the activity represents 
some sort of class-wide interest by looking at the structural location of the actors. 
If they are central, it is likely they represent a set of cohesive and collective 
interests. In addition, we can predict which corporate actors are likely to be 
involved in important political actions, as the more powerful (i.e., central in the 
network) actors are more likely to be involved in shaping policy.  
 
 
The Interlock Network, Political Cohesion, and Political Activity 
 
Most analysts of corporate political behavior agree that the default position of 
business is political fragmentation. That is, different economic sectors often have 
opposing interests on specific issues. For instance, automakers like General Motors, 
which may benefit from being able to import cheap steel, should be opposed to steel 
tariffs. On the other hand, U.S. Steel would benefit from the tariffs driving up the 
price of their product. Even within industries, the competition among firms for 
market share could easily preclude any sort of collective political action. The key, 
then, for analysts who argue that the corporate elite are relatively politically unified, 
is the existence of mechanisms that are “capable of mediating and resolving 
intercorporate disputes” (Mizruchi, 1989: 402). There are four key mechanisms 
identified by prior scholarship to facilitate cohesive corporate political activity: face 
to face communication between representatives of a wide variety of competing 
interests, diffusion of information, creation of a business leadership that is 
politically active and class-wide in its rationality, and the ability to sanction deviant 
behavior that goes against class interests. These four mechanisms were a feature of 
the interlock network until around 1990 (Mizruchi, 2013; Chu and Davis, 2016). 
Not only did it allow the corporate elite to be relatively unified politically, but it 
meant that the intercorporate network was a reliable map of power and influence 
within the business community.  
 
Face to Face Communication 
 
One of the primary reasons corporations interlock with other firms by 
inviting outside directors onto their boards is to gain what Useem (1984: 45-48) 
terms “business scan.” Business scan is “the ability to monitor business practices 
as well as national and world events” (Mizruchi, 2013: 132), through access to 
“what other businessmen think, taking the longer view particularly” (quotation by 
a senior petroleum executive, as told to Useem, 1984:55). This motivation for 
interlocking results in a large proportion of a company’s directors coming from 
outside the firm and from a wide array of industries. Hence, the boardrooms of 
heavily interlocked companies serve as a forum where the leadership of different 
industries meet face to face (Chu and Davis, 2016: 718).  
 
For the vast majority of the 20th century, the most heavily interlocked 
companies were financial institutions such as Citigroup, J.P. Morgan & Co, and 
Chase Manhattan Bank (the last two merged into JP Morgan Chase in 2000). Banks, 
by nature of their investments in every sector of the economy, had the greatest need 
for business scan. Early in the century, banks leveraged their control of capital 
flows to place themselves on the boards of non-financial corporations (Roy, 1983; 
Chu and Davis, 2016: 718). By the 1960s, this had reversed and banks were central 
because they invited the CEOs of all the major non-financial firms to sit on their 
own boards (Mintz and Schwartz, 1985; Mizruchi, 2013). For instance, the board 
of Chase Manhattan Bank included the CEOs of fourteen Fortune 500 companies 
in 1982 (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999: 217-18; cited in Mizruchi, 2013: 131). Those 
fourteen CEOs represented twelve different industries (Murray, 2017: 12). Hence, 
banks have a history of serving as a place where the corporate elite meet face to 
face. The fact that banks dominated the center of the network for most of the 20th 
century6 is thought to be integral to the intercorporate network’s role in generating 
political cohesion. This is because banks, by nature of their economy-wide 
interests, feature discussion of class-wide issues at their board meetings. Thus, bank 
board meetings brought together representatives of competing and unaligned 
interests for face to face discussion of class-wide issues, providing an arena where 
the corporate elite could develop a class-wide consensus (Mizruchi, 2013: 130-31).  
 
 
 
 
6 Bank centrality begins to decline in the 1990s and is part of the decline of the intercorporate 
network (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999).  
Diffusion of Information and Normative Consensus 
 
 The ideas discussed and consensus developed at the board meetings of 
highly central corporations do not just influence the individuals on that board. Each 
of the outside directors brings that information and consensus back with them to 
their home company’s board meetings, potentially diffusing it to all members of 
that board, resulting in each company developing similar policies. This process is 
known as mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
 
Chase Manhattan’s 1982 board serves as an excellent example of how this 
diffusion hypothetically takes place7. The president of Exxon, Howard C. 
Kauffman, sat on the board with the CEOs of 14 other companies. Kauffman 
contributed to the diffusion of information from the Chase Manhattan board in two 
ways: 1) directly, through his position on the boards of Exxon and Pfizer (where he 
was an outside director); and 2) indirectly by spreading that information to board 
members of Exxon and Pfizer, who then go on to spread it to other companies they 
direct. For example, the CEO of J.C. Penny, William R. Howell, served as an 
outside director at Exxon in 1982. This means that if the directors of Chase 
Manhattan had reached a consensus about supporting a tax increase in order to cut 
the growing deficit and get out of the recession, Kauffman could spread it to the 
other board members of Exxon, which included Howell. Howell, then, could bring 
that message to the board room of J.C. Penny, further diffusing the ideas that 
originated at Chase Manhattan8. 
 
 A number of studies have provided support for the above description of 
diffusion through corporate networks. For instance, Mizruchi (1989; 1992) finds 
that the political action committees (PACs) of corporations that share board 
members with the same commercial bank are more likely to donate to the same 
Congressional candidates. In addition, firms that share directors are more likely to 
take the same positions during Congressional testimony (Mizruchi, 1992), adopt 
the same policies, such as the “poison pill” (Davis, 1991), and engage in the same 
behavior, such as making corporate acquisitions (Haunschild, 1993) or having 
executives serve on the same trade advisory committees and trade policy alliances 
(Dreiling and Darves, 2011; 2016). In addition, Burris (2005) finds that individual 
corporate executives who sit on the same boards together are more likely to donate 
money to the same presidential candidates and the same political parties. In fact, 
the effect on individual political cohesion extends out to six steps in the network 
 
7 Interlock data comes from Davis and Mizruchi (1999: 218). 
8 Support for a tax increase to cut the deficit was actually a position taken by the Business 
Roundtable in 1982. In fact, the CEO of Exxon met with President Reagan to advocate a cut to 
defense spending and a raise in excise taxes (Mizruchi, 2013: 230).  
(i.e., director A sits on a board with someone, who sits on a board with someone, 
who sits on a board with director B; or a friend of a friend of a friend).  
  
Leading Edge of Business 
 
 The practice of individuals directing multiple corporations not only 
connects large business into one big network through which information and norms 
can spread, it also creates a leading edge of business political activity (Useem, 
1984: 76). Generally, around 15-20% of directors sit on multiple boards, creating a 
relatively small inner circle of corporate elites (Useem, 1984; Domhoff, 2014: 28). 
The experience of directing multiple companies (each from different sectors of the 
economy) broadens the worldview of inner circle members beyond the narrow 
interests of their individual firms, facilitating a more cosmopolitan, class-wide 
rationality (Useem, 1984: 45-48; Mintz and Schwartz, 1985: 135; Mizruchi, 2013: 
134-36).  
 
 The result of this class-wide rationality is a greater proclivity to engage in 
political activism on behalf of the class, which puts the inner circle at “the forefront 
of business political outreach” (Useem, 1984: 76). For instance, individuals that 
direct multiple companies have, in the past, been more likely than their single 
company counterparts to provide advisory service to the government, governance 
of non-profits institutions, and to have contact with the media (Useem, 1984: 76-
79, 87-90). In addition, inner circle status influences individual political donation 
patterns (Heerwig and Murray, 2018; Burris, 2001), and the common presence of 
inner circle members on the boards of two companies increases the unity of their 
PACs political donations (Murray, 2017).  
 
Sanctioning Deviant Behavior 
 
 Even with a class-conscious inner circle of directors knitting together the 
corporate community and advocating for class-wide interests in and out of the 
boardroom, the divergent interests of large corporations could still preclude any 
sort of political cohesion if rogue elements of the corporate elite are able to freely 
pursue their own narrow interests at the expense of class interests. This is where 
the fourth mechanism that the intercorporate network provides- the ability of the 
class-wide elements to sanction deviant behavior- is integral to political cohesion 
among the corporate elite.  
 
 Deviant behavior is sanctioned in two ways. The first manner is entirely a 
network mechanism- that is, it involves excluding the offending party from the 
network. There are significant benefits accrued to both the company and individual 
who takes part in the intercorporate network. For the company, as we previously 
discussed, there is “business scan” (Useem, 1984: 45-47). For the individual 
director, it extends their range of networks and acquaintances, was considered 
almost a perquisite for promotion to the most senior positions in the company, and 
nets them extra pay (Useem, 1984: 47-49). The sanction for deviant behavior, in 
this instance, is expulsion from the network- dropping the director from his or her 
board positions. The way this reinforces class-wide cohesion is illuminated in 
Useem’s (1984: 53-55) discussion with inner circle members regarding the use of 
inside information for profit. For the inner circle, the ultimate sin is to take 
information from one board meeting and use it against that company and for the 
profit of the individual or their company. The role of the inner circle is to help all 
members of the corporate elite succeed through cooperation and sharing of general 
information and ideas, not use their position on multiple boards to engage in 
competition. As one experienced chairman and outside director told Useem (1984: 
54), “you don’t get invited into the club… if you are being suspected of using inside 
information or self-dealings… you would be considered an outcast.” The norm 
against inner circle members pursuing individual interests is consistent with the 
origins of the interlock network- J.P. Morgan and his associates reorganized the 
railroad and other major industries at the turn of the 20th century, placing himself 
and his associates on the different companies’ boards in order to create what he 
called a “community of interest” that would avoid destructive competition (Corey, 
1930; Mizruchi, 1982: 97-99; Perrow, 2002: 216; Mizruchi, 2013: 24).   
 
 The other mechanism for sanctioning corporate elites that go against the 
class-wide agenda is a function of bank centrality in the network. The most central 
firms in the interlock network, as a result of having boards composed of the leaders 
of many different industries and having indirect connections to nearly the entire 
corporate elite, are the origin point of class-wide rationality. That is, one of the 
primary places that the collective class interest is developed is in the boardrooms 
of the companies at the center of the network. When these companies are banks (as 
they were from the turn of the 20th century until at least the mid-1990s), that class-
wide interest is backed up by control over capital flows. Their control over capital 
flows allows banks to intervene through actions such as stock dumping, loan 
refusal, debt renegotiation, and bankruptcy to sanction any corporate elites who are 
threatening the class interest (Mintz and Schwartz, 1985: 76-109; Mizruchi, 2013: 
135-36). This sort of direct bank intervention is rare precisely because it is effective. 
That is, it only takes a few high profile sanctions in order to deter other would be 
rogues.  
 
 Together, these four mechanisms featured in the interlock network helped 
bring political cohesion to the corporate elite for nearly a century. Face to face 
communication by representatives of different industries allowed the leadership of 
the corporate community to mediate intercorporate disputes and build consensus 
around non-oppositional interests and policies. The experience of directing multiple 
companies broadened the view of this leadership and helped them to develop a 
class-wide perspective that informed the policies they developed. The vast and 
dense interlock network created by their positions on multiple boards served as a 
system of communication where information and norms could spread through the 
network to non-inner circle members and more peripheral companies. Finally, the 
position of big banks at the center of the network provided class-wide interests with 
the backing of those who control the flow of capital, allowing the inner circle to 
enforce their class-wide policies and sanction deviant behavior. 
 
 What this all meant for the power structure researcher, as previously 
discussed, was that the interlocking directorate network was a good map of class-
wide interests and power. For example, if the President of the United States named 
the CEO of a company central in the interlock network to his cabinet, one could 
infer that class-wide interests would influence the President’s policy. On the other 
hand, if the appointee was peripheral in the network, we would predict policies 
geared around the narrow interests of the economic sector the appointee was 
affiliated with. If a group of firms central in the network lobbied on behalf of a 
trade deal, it’s likely the trade deal was in the service of class-wide interests. If the 
only firms lobbying on behalf of a policy are peripheral firms from the same 
industry, however, we can conclude that the policy is only of interest to that sector 
of the capitalist class. That is, from the turn of the 20th century to around 1990, the 
interlock network could be used to make sense of corporate political activity.  
 
 
Decline of the Interlock Network 
 
While the interlocking directorate network held the above features and served as a 
reliable proxy for class-wide power for most of the 20th century, during the 1980s 
the financialization of the U.S. economy began to change the behavior of both non-
financials and the large commercial banks that occupied the center of the network 
(Useem, 1996; Mizruchi, 2013). By 1990, these changes in economic behavior 
began to result in changes to the interlock network (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999). 
 
Each of the key mechanisms contributing to the cohesion of the corporate 
elite (discussed above) has an associated network property that allows the 
mechanism to function. For example, the diffusion of class-wide information and 
norms from the center to the periphery is made possible by individuals who direct 
large amounts of companies and thus, create a densely connected network. Chu and 
Davis (2016) refer to these individuals as “big linkers” and define them as 
individuals who direct six or more large corporations. Each of the other 
mechanisms has a similar causal network feature: face to face meetings are related 
both to the practice of interlocking between companies in different industries and 
the size of company boards; the leading edge of business is also created by 
interlocking; and finally, the ability for the corporate elite to sanction behavior that 
threatens class interests is predicated on the centrality of banks. From 1980 to 2000, 
each of these network features changed, leading some scholars to infer that the 
corporate elite are fractured (Mizruchi, 2013; Chu and Davis, 2016).  
  
The Moneyed Center Cannot Hold9 
 
 Throughout the 1980s, non-financial companies began to increasingly use 
commercial paper to raise funds, rather than take loans from commercial banks. 
The consequence of this was that as non-financials became more heavily involved 
in financial activities such as commercial loans, commercial banks recouped their 
lost profits by moving into investment banking activities. This marked an important 
shift for banks, away from their traditional role in allocating financial capital, and 
into their new role as financial services providers.  
 
As the allocators of capital, banks profited only when the entire capitalist 
class profited. That is, commercial and industrial loans are more likely to be repaid 
with interest when the companies taking the loans profit and stay in business. Since 
the loans were made to all sectors of the economy, banks had an interest in the 
economic system as a whole. This class-wide interest heightened the banks’ desire 
for business scan, and thus, commercial banks traditionally had large boards with 
outside directors representing every sector of the economy. Once banks shifted into 
investment banking-like activity, they shrunk their boards and stopped inviting as 
many non-financial CEOs to serve as outside directors, resulting in a decline in 
bank centrality in the intercorporate network. 
 
This decline in bank centrality has two effects on cohesion: 1) with smaller 
bank boards and less outside directors, the bank boardroom ceased to be the 
meeting place for the corporate elite. That is, banks no longer served as the site 
where representative of different economic sectors met face to face.  Since banks 
were unique among corporations in their concern with system-wide issues, this 
meant that representatives of different economic sectors were forming consensus 
on class-wide through face to face discussion less often than they were in the past; 
2) there was a decoupling of class-wide interests and the ability to sanction deviant 
 
9 This account is based on Mizruchi (2013) and Davis and Mizruchi (1999) unless otherwise 
noted; section subtitle is the title of the Davis and Mizruchi (1999) piece.  
behavior. To explain, class-wide interests and rationality are not objectively 
realized, even if they are rooted in material reality. They are socially constructed 
through face to face interactions among the leaders of different economic sectors 
and diffused through networks. Thus, the way that different (often opposing) 
material interests are blended into class-wide interests depends on social processes. 
Although banks still have the ability to use the stock market and other financial 
instruments to check behavior that threatens their interests (especially given their 
dominance as institutional investors, and primary role in mergers and acquisitions, 
and IPOs), since they are no longer at the center of the corporate network, their 
interests likely do not reflect a class-wide interest.  
 
Death of the Inner Circle10 
 
One of the things that made the density of the intercorporate network such 
a stable feature of the 20th century was the propensity of large corporations to give 
preference for outside directorships to individuals who already direct multiple 
companies (Useem, 1984). During the 2000s this inclination reversed itself and the 
inner circle became less preferred. The result is that Big Linkers (i.e., directors that 
sit on 6 or more boards) had completely disappeared from the network by 2010. 
Big Linkers were inordinately responsible for tying the entire network together, 
which is what allowed information to diffuse from the center of the network to the 
periphery. For instance, in the year 2000, the most central company could reach 
84% of other firms in the network within three steps (which represented more than 
70% of the overall Fortune 500). By 2010, this had fallen to 60% of firms in the 
network (and just more than 50% of the Fortune 500).  
 
 Of course, diffusion of information and norms is not the only function that 
the inner circle played in bringing political cohesion to the corporate elite. The other 
aspect of inner circle influence, which is emphasized more by Useem (1984) than 
their role creating network ties, is service as the leading voice of class-wide 
interests in the political sphere. As previously discussed, their experience directing 
multiple firms changes their perspective from a narrow firm-centric one to a class-
wide one that includes the impetus to act politically to secure class-wide interests. 
 
 As it turns out, the proportion of Fortune 500 directors that sit on two or 
more boards has remained stable, even as overall density in the network falls. As 
table 1 shows, while big linkers may have disappeared, the inner circle of 
individuals directing multiple companies has not (Heerwig and Murray, 2018). 
 
 
10 This account is based on Chu and Davis (2016), unless otherwise noted. The section subtitle is 
inspired by their article. 
  
Table 1: Proportion of Corporate Elite that Direct Multiple Large 
Corporations, 1982-2010 
 
Year Multiple Companies Single Company Big 
Linkers 
N  
1982 0.20 0.80 21 6,505  
1990 0.20 0.80 17 5,393  
2010 0.19 0.81 111 4,498  
Note: 1982 data from Davis et al. (2003); 1990 from Davis (1991; 1996); and 
2010 from this study- Study population differs across the sources.  
 
In addition, the phenomenon of inner circle directors being much more politically 
active has not only remained stable, but actually seems to have increased.  
 
 
 
Table 2: Percentage of Single Company and Inner Circle directors Who 
Provide Advisory Service to the Federal Government12 
 
Number of large company 
directorships 
1976 Federal Advisory 
Committees  
2011 Presidential 
Commissions 
One 13.6 1.2 
Two or More (Inner 
Circle) 
17.9 4.2 
Ratio 2+/1 1.3 3.5 
 
 
While the percentages of directors participating in government service appear to 
have declined, this is an artifact of sample. The 1976 data looked at over 1,000 
federal advisory committees, while the 2011 data look at 19 Presidential 
Commissions. The more revealing comparison across time is the ratio of inner 
circle participation to single company directors. Here, we see that the inner circle 
advantage was greater in 2011. Thus, table 1 and 2 illustrate that the inner circle 
still serves as a leading edge of business political activity. This suggests that the 
 
11 Phillip Laskaway sat on 6 boards (Progressive, Henry Schein, Discover, Loews, Fannie Mae, 
and General Motors) 
12 1976 data from Useem (CH 8 in Domhoff, 1980: 209-212); 2010 data from this study- study 
population differs across sources.  
companies at the center of the interlock network are still populated by actors 
motivated by class-wide interests. Yet, the decline of the interlock network hampers 
their ability to either diffuse or defend through sanctions the class-wide perspective, 
pitting the inner circle against a cadre of corporate actors pursuing narrow and 
oppositional interests. 
 
 Much of the above discussion of the decline of the intercorporate networks 
suggests that without alternative sources of cohesion, the corporate elite is unable 
to realize a class-wide perspective. This is the foundation of the fractured elite 
thesis. This thesis may be wrong if there are alternative sources for the development 
of class-wide policies, but even with alternative sources, the interlock network is 
no longer likely to be a very good map of class-wide political interests and power 
(Chu and Davis, 2016: 750). In the next section, we will lay out our argument for 
the PPN as both an alternative source of cohesion and a wonderful map of class-
wide power.  
 
 
The Policy Planning Network  
 
The PPN consists of three different types of non-profit organizations: 1) policy 
discussion groups13, like the Business Roundtable; 2) think tanks, such as the 
Brookings Institute or Heritage Foundation; and 3) charitable foundations, like the 
Ford Foundation (Domhoff, 2014:74). Although this network dates back to the 
early 20th century14 (Domhoff and Webber, 2011: 43-44), the PPN has significantly 
expanded since the 1970s. For instance, two-thirds of all think tanks in the world 
were established after 1970 (McGann, 2002: 14). The Business Roundtable, by far 
the most central policy discussion group in the current network (Domhoff, 2014: 
80), was founded in 1972 (Waterhouse, 2014: 78; Domhoff, 2014: 100). In fact, 
Barnes (2017) finds that policy planning organizations have drastically increased 
their importance in terms of connecting large corporations to each other. In fact, 
between 1973 and 1995, which is the exact time frame of the fracturing of the 
interlock network (Mizruchi, 2013), the share of corporate network density (i.e., 
how connected corporations are to each other) that policy planning organizations 
are responsible for increased by over 200%. Although the PPN may have, as 
Domhoff (2015) argues, always been a center of corporate class-wide power, we 
lack the data to test this claim. Regardless of the importance of the PPN in the past, 
however, it is eminently plausible, given the expansion since the 1970s, that as  
 
13 Useem (1980; 1984) termed them Business Policy Associations 
14 Brookings Institute was founded in 1916 as the Institute for Government Research, Carnegie 
and Rockefeller foundations in 1911 and 1913 respectively, and the Council on Foreign Relations 
in 1921 (Domhoff, 2014) 
  
banks abandoned the center of intercorporate network and its contribution to 
cohesion declined, the PPN has remained as the corporate network holding together 
the corporate elite. This would significantly alter the fractured elite thesis, as a 
fracturing of the domestic interlock network would not necessarily lead to a 
fracturing of the corporate elite. 
 
In addition, one of the counter arguments to the fractured elite thesis is that 
the U.S. elites, like other domestic elites around the world, have simply moved from 
being domestically oriented to being globally oriented, and cohesion is found 
through transnational mechanisms (Murray, 2017; Carroll, 2010; Sklair, 2001; 
Robinson and Harris, 2000). The U.S. PPN is a globally oriented network. Four of 
the ten most central PPN organizations in 201115 are clearly globally oriented: 
Council on Foreign Relations, Institute for International Economics, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, and the Atlantic Council of the United States. 
In addition, research has demonstrated that the most central organization, the 
Business Roundtable, is also globally oriented (Staples, Ch 5 in Murray and Scott, 
2012). In the rest of this section, we will lay out our argument for why the 
characteristics of the PPN make it very likely that it is the current center of 
corporate class-wide rationality. 
 
First, unlike the interlock network where it is arguably an unintended 
consequence, the PPN’s primary function is to facilitate class-wide cohesion and 
political action. That is, the organizations in the network primarily exist to 
formulate policy and then disseminate those policy suggestions to the Democratic 
Party, Republican Party, Congress, and the White House (Dye, 2001: 39; Domhoff, 
2014: 74). Because the corporate elite are able to embed themselves into the 
network, these policies end up reflecting corporate interests. Figure 1 illustrates the 
process through which policy preferences flow from the corporate elite to 
government through the PPN. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 Source for 2011 data on PPN is this study 
  
 
 
Figure 1: Flow of Policy from the Corporate Community and Upper Class to 
Government through the Policy Planning Network 
 
 
Source: Figure 1 in Domhoff (2014: 78)  
 It is important to note that one can quibble with the direction of arrows in 
figure 1- for instance, policy discussion groups also contribute ideas to think tanks 
that serve as the impetus for research reports, while the ideas and reports generated 
by think tanks can influence what issues foundations find important. The 
significance of figure 1 to our argument is as an illustration of how the PPN 
becomes oriented around corporate interests. The primary mechanisms that orient 
the policy planning network towards the general preferences of the corporate elite 
are capital flows and personnel transfer. As figure 1 depicts, the corporate elite are 
the major financers of think tanks, charitable foundations, and policy discussion 
groups. In addition, a significant number of trustees of think tanks and foundations 
come from the ranks of the corporate elite, as does the membership of policy 
discussion groups. Personnel transfer is where the PPN is linked to the interlock 
network. The corporate members of the PPN are not just drawn from the leadership 
ranks of large companies, but disproportionately from the inner circle. This was 
true in the late 1970s when Useem (1984) studied the inner circle, and it is still true 
today (or, more accurately, as of 2011), as evidenced by table 3.  
 
Table 3: Percentage of Single Company and Inner Circle directors who are 
Members the PPN, 2011 
 
Number of large 
company 
directorships 
Business Policy 
Associations 
Think Tanks Foundations 
One 4.5 2.6 0.8 
Two or More 
(Inner Circle) 
11.3 7.2 1.2 
Ratio 2+/1 2.51 2.77 1.5 
Source: this study 
  
The overrepresentation of the inner circle in the PPN is important for 
understanding what the policies developed in this network likely represent. If the 
PPN was dominated by oil executives, we might conclude that the policies 
disseminated to government would reflect only energy industry interests. If the PPN 
was populated by a collection of single company directors, we might imagine the 
policy process is fraught with struggle between representatives of narrow 
worldviews, where different parts of the policy network represent disparate 
interests. The disproportionate membership of the inner circle in the PPN suggests 
the opposite- that the policy planning process is geared around translating the broad 
perspective of the inner circle into policies that serve class-wide interests.  
 
At this juncture it is important to explain how the inner circle can dominate 
the PPN and gear the policy planning process towards class-wide interests when 
they make up less than 10% of the leadership of these organizations. The 
mechanism that orients the PPN towards business interests is funding. Most of the 
money for foundations, think tanks, and policy groups comes from corporate 
sources (Domhoff, 2014). Thus, we can expect the business perspective voiced by 
business representatives to have extra sway in the boardrooms simply because it is 
backed by capital flows. That is, PPN organizational leadership is comprised of 
business representatives, political elites, and academics. The fact that the 
organizations are funded by business sets up a clear purpose for each type of 
member- the business representatives are there to voice the policy interests of the 
capitalist class; the political elite are there to help translate that interest into policy 
that is politically feasible, and to serve as a connection to government; the 
academics are there to help craft the details of the policy. Thus, the policy process 
is geared around business interests.  
 
This leaves the question of how those business interests become class-wide 
as opposed to muddied by sectoral differences. The key mechanisms are the unity 
of the inner circle around a class-wide perspective (Useem, 1984; Murray, 2017). 
To illustrate, let us use a hypothetical board meeting at the think tank the Brookings 
Institute. Its board is comprised of 29 political elites and academics, two billionaire 
investors who serve on no Fortune 500 boards, three Fortune 500 CEOs who serve 
on no other boards (although one used to serve on multiple boards, and another 
would go on to join the inner circle), six CEOs of Fortune 500 companies that also 
serve on the boards of multiple smaller companies, and nine Fortune 500 inner 
circle members. That means that 20 of the 29 Brookings trustees are from the 
business world, and nine of those 20 are current inner circle members16. Even if we 
imagine that the 11 non-inner circle business representatives are divided by their 
own narrow interests, the nine inner circle members are united around a class-wide 
perspective that blends the interests of the other eleven. Thus, the nine inner circle 
members can easily push their version of class-wide interests by acting as a bloc, 
while the other eleven are divided. This is unlikely to be the case, however, as the 
class-wide perspective is also in the interest of the other eleven, it just emphasizes 
sacrificing some short-term sectoral profits for the long-term viability of all sectors. 
What is likely, then, is that the inner circle perspective is able to win support from 
the non-inner circle business representatives and the board is able to reach 
consensus about what the class-wide interests of business are. The 29 non-business 
 
16 That is if we limit the definition to directing multiple Fortune 500 companies. If we expand it to 
directing multiple companies, then 15 of the 20 would be inner circle members. We use the 
Fortune 500 definition because it if the one that has empirical backing in terms of political unity 
and class-wide interests. Of course, it is also the only definition that has really been measured.  
trustees are not going to oppose this, as their role is not to define business interests 
but to help guide the policy process towards serving those interests. Hence, each 
PPN organization may come to a slightly different consensus, or focus on slightly 
different problems, but the core of the PPN that is populated by inner circle 
members will end up orienting their organization’s actions around similar 
perspectives of the class-wide interest. 
 
The above description of the PPN may seem implausible, given the clear 
partisan divide between organizations such as the Heritage Foundation and the 
Brookings Institution. A glance at the two organizations’ websites illustrates this, 
with Heritage headlines defending and rationalizing Trump administration 
behavior, while Brookings critiques it. If one were to use the Internet Archive17 to 
go back to these two think tanks’ websites during the Obama era, the reverse would 
be true (Brookings supporting the President and Heritage critiquing). The opposing 
partisan loyalties of right wing and centrist think tanks masks the policy agreement 
they have on many issues, but especially on issues of class-wide concern for the 
corporate elite. For example, both the Heritage Foundation and the Brookings 
Institution supported cutting the corporate income tax from 35% to around 25%18 
and U.S. ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade agreement19. In 
addition, much of the framework for the Affordable Care Act (which Brookings 
has been mostly positive about20) came from the Heritage Foundation21. These 
policy similarities are evidence of the ability of corporate elite consensus to diffuse 
through the PPN, not only across partisan divides, but also from the center of the 
network to the periphery as Brookings is the 4th most central organization in a 
combined corporate/PPN network, while Heritage ranks no. 321 (Domhoff, 2014: 
89).  
 
Not only does the corporate inner circle membership of the PPN suggest 
that the network generates policies oriented around class-wide interests, but the 
structure of the PPN itself holds suggests its potential as a source of corporate 
political mobilization and cohesion, and thus serving as a buffer for the possible 
effects of the decline of the interlock network. This is because corporations are tied 
 
17 https://archive.org/  
18 Brookings: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/35-percent-is-way-too-high-for-corporate-
taxes/; Heritage: https://www.heritage.org/taxes/commentary/america-competitive-again-thanks-
lower-corporate-tax-rate  
19 Brookings: https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-trans-pacific-partnership-the-politics-of-
openness-and-leadership-in-the-asia-pacific/; Heritage: https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/the-
trans-pacific-partnership-questions-congress-must-answer  
20 For example: https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/is-obamacare-working-yes/  
21 http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2010/apr/01/barack-obama/obama-says-
heritage-foundation-source-health-excha/ 
together by their directors’ participation in common PPN organizations. For 
instance, both General Electric (GE) and J.P. Morgan Chase have directors serving 
as trustees of the Brookings Institution. Thus, even though GE and J.P. Morgan 
Chase were not tied through the interlock network in 2010 (i.e., they have no 
common directors), they were tied through the PPN network via common 
participation in the leadership of the Brookings Institution. Thus, like the interlock 
network (which ties corporation together via the common participation of company 
executives on the same corporate boards), the PPN is a corporate social network.  
 
For example, as we previously discussed, the most central companies in the 
interlock network bring together the directors of a wide array of different economic 
sectors to discuss issues of general importance to that company. PPN organization 
serve the same function. The most obvious example is the Business Roundtable, 
whose membership consists of the CEOs of the largest companies in the U.S., 
ultimately bringing together representatives of 171 different Fortune 500 firms to 
take part in committees that engage in explicit discussion of policy issues ranging 
from tax and fiscal policy to immigration to health22. But this function is not limited 
to policy discussion groups. Think tanks and foundations also serve the function of 
facilitating face to face interaction among corporate elites. For instance, the Center 
for Strategic and International Studies has on its board of trustees the 
representatives of 25 different Fortune 500 companies including Coca Cola, Pepsi, 
General Motors, General Electric, Exxon Mobil, Dow Chemical, and CBS. These 
trustees, representing a broad range of economic sectors, meet to decide the general 
direction research that the think tank should take and what issues they should tackle. 
Foundation boards are similar as they are populated by corporate representatives 
(e.g., Rockefeller Brothers Fund has representatives of 13 different Fortune 500 
companies on its board, including Bank of America, Citigroup, General Electric, 
and Walt Disney) who meet to decide on the general goal of projects the foundation 
funds, in the process developing an outlook towards philanthropy that takes into 
account the interests of a wide array of economic sectors.  
 
This face to face communication theoretically helps to facilitate class-wide 
politics by helping those corporate elites involved in the PPN to transcend their 
narrow sectoral interests and to develop policy perspectives that are broader and 
more class-wide. In doing so, the PPN can then aid in the creation of a leading edge 
of business political action that operates on a class-wide rationale.  
 
Previously, we discussed the inner circle effect in terms of creating this 
leading edge and demonstrated that the inner circle is still a stable part of the 
 
22 http://businessroundtable.org/about/committees 
interlock network and that inner circle members are disproportionately engaged in 
the PPN. This inner circle, who are already operating with a broad perspective due 
to their experiences directing companies in multiple sectors, is able to translate that 
perspective into class-wide politics in their role as leadership of the PPN. That is, 
PPN leadership explicitly engages in the development of policies around political 
issues, as opposed to corporate boards where political issues are not the main focus.  
 
Once the leading edge of business politics has arrived at a set of class-wide 
policy approaches through discussions in various PPN organizations, those 
corporate directors bring this information back with them to their respective 
corporate boards. Diffusion of class-wide policies and norms is another place where 
the involvement of the inner circle in the PPN is so integral- information from the 
PPN is much more efficiently diffused to the rest of the corporate world through 
the positions inner circle members hold on multiple boards. In fact, recent research 
suggests that inner circle members are the likely mechanism through which policy 
groups like the Business Roundtable bring unity to corporate PAC donations 
(Murray, 2017: 40-41). This process of diffusion also means that the corporations 
that are the most central in the PPN network will likely develop policies best 
reflecting class-wide rationality. Hence the PPN is a good candidate for a map of 
corporate class-wide interests with the center representing the most powerful class-
wide actors and the periphery representing a narrower and less influential set of 
interests. 
 
 Finally, the PPN holds the same potential as the interlock network to 
sanction deviant behavior. The two mechanisms through which the interlock 
network enforced cohesion were the threat of exclusion from the inner circle club 
for individual directors who pursue narrow individual interests above those of the 
class (Useem, 1985), and economic sanctions by the large banks that for almost a 
century sat in the middle of the interlock network (Mintz and Schwartz, 1984).  
 
Similar to the threat of exclusion from the inner circle of the board interlock 
network, individuals can have their membership in PPN organizations revoked. 
While we know of no example of a corporate director being explicitly excluded 
from the board of a PPN org for going against class interests, there have been 
examples of scholars being fired from their think tank positions for going against 
business interests. A recent case, involved the ousting of a critic of Google from his 
position at the New America Foundation23. If the corporate members of PPN boards 
will oust non-corporate members of the PPN for going against business interests, 
the threat of rogue board members also being excluded for going against the class 
 
23 https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/30/us/politics/eric-schmidt-google-new-america.html?_r=0 
interest is a credible threat. That is, serving in leadership positions such as on the 
board of trustees of a foundation or think tank or on the executive committee of a 
policy group are by invitation. Any time one is invited to something there is an 
understanding that bad behavior could result in no longer being invited. The 
implicit threat (however rare in practice) can influence behavior when the invitation 
is valuable. Useem makes the argument that leadership positions in PPN type 
groups are a necessary qualification before those individuals are consulted by the 
government (Useem, 1984: 99-102). In fact, an analysis of the Clinton, Bush, and 
Obama administrations finds that the primary thing tying together the cabinets of 
these three Presidents is former affiliation with the PPN (van Apeldoorn and de 
Graaf, 2016). Thus, exclusion from this network is exclusion from a valuable 
resource.  
 
 Economic sanctions by banks on deviant behavior is a function of banks 
being at the center of the network. It is an empirical question, but if banks are at the 
center of the PPN network, then the policies and norms coming from the center of 
that network will be backed up by the control of capital flows, which provides a 
mechanism for enforcing class-wide interests.  
 
 Much of our above argument is at this point speculative and backed by very 
little evidence. What is clear, however, is that the PPN holds the potential to serve 
many of the same functions regarding association with class-wide corporate politics 
as the pre-1990 interlock network, and thus also holds the potential to serve as a 
map of corporate class-wide interests and power. The rest of this paper is dedicated 
to providing empirical evidence to support our speculations.  
  
 
Data and Methods 
 
Population 
 
 The guiding question this study seeks to answer is what are the indicators 
of class-wide politics among the corporate elite? The answer we have proposed is 
that the inner circle of individuals who direct multiple large corporations and the 
PPN both function to mobilize cohesive political action among corporate elites, and 
thus inner circle status and position in the PPN are indicators of class-wide politics. 
An empirical test of our proposed theoretical model requires a definition of the 
corporate elite. This is complex because the corporate elite are dual, in that they are 
made up of both individuals and organizations. For example, both JP Morgan Chase 
and James Dimon (CEO of JP Morgan Chase) are corporate elites, just at different 
levels of analysis.  
Much of the past research on the political behavior of the corporate elite has 
studied organizations. Mizruchi (1992) makes the exemplar case for doing so, 
arguing essentially that the capitalist class acts through corporate organizations. 
Burris and Staples (2012), on the other hand, make a convincing argument for 
focusing on individuals when attempting to study a class or an elite, since it is 
individuals that act, even within the organization. The best way to conceptualize 
the corporate elite is dual- both organization and individual. Thus, we would ideally 
have two populations: organizations and the directors of those organizations. 
Unfortunately, measures of individual political behavior are difficult to obtain. 
First, one of the only individual political behavior that is recorded is campaign 
donations of over $200 as required by the Federal Election Commission (FEC). 
Second, the FEC data on individual donations is formatted where each observation 
is a single donation, rather than donor; and there is no unique identifier for donors 
(Heerwig, 2018). This makes analysis of individual donations extremely difficult. 
Organizations, on the other hand, have unique identifiers in the FEC data, and there 
is additional political behavior data available such as lobbying expenditure. 
 
While it would be ideal to have both organizational and individual data, it 
is not necessary for the purpose of this study. What we are truly interested in is 
whether corporate elite unified political action is robust to the decline of the 
organizational interlock network because the inner circle and the PPN also serve as 
mechanisms for mobilization and mediating intercorporate disputes. For this 
specific purpose, organizational political behavior is sufficient. That is, 
organizations take political action through their political action committees (PACs) 
and they also have inner circle members on their boards and engage with the PPN. 
Thus, an investigation of corporate elite behavior focused on organizations does 
allow a test of our argument. Following past convention, we limit the sample to the 
Fortune 500 in order to reflect the true elites of the corporate world. The final 
sample is 500 corporations directed by 4,498 individuals.  
  
Data Sources 
 
 Corporate and PPN Networks: Network data is calculated using UCInet and 
affiliation matrixes of the board of director affiliations between Fortune 500 
companies in 2010 and director/trustee/member affiliations between corporation 
and PPN organization in 2011. The data on board membership of Fortune 500 
companies in 2010, along with the membership lists of PPN organization leadership 
in 2011 come from Domhoff, Staples, and Schneider (2013). The lag between 
corporate board membership and PPN leadership is to allow time for new board 
members to join PPN organizations. The original data from Domhoff, et al. only 
included firms that had at least one interlock to either another firm or to one of the 
PPN organizations. This left eight Fortune 500 firms out of the dataset. We 
manually added those eight firms in, in order to have a complete sample of the 
Fortune 500.  
 
 Corporate Organizational Characteristics: Data on each organization (i.e., 
primary industry, total revenue, etc.) comes from the 2010 Fortune 500 list, the 
website siccode.com (which lists the SIC code for a firm’s primary industry) and 
the company 2010 annual report to investors.  
 
 Corporate Political Behavior: We use three different indicator variables for 
corporate political behavior (each will be discussed below): campaign donations, 
lobbying expenditures, and advisory service to President Obama. Data on advisory 
service to the President comes from Domhoff et al., (2013), while political action 
committee (PAC) donations and lobbying activity comes from the Center for 
Responsive Politics24.  
 
Dependent Variables 
 
 Political Mobilization: In most studies of corporate political behavior that 
examine the role of corporate networks, the measure of political activity is 
campaign donations (for example, see Clawson and Neustadtl, 1989; Mizruchi, 
1989;1992, Burris and Salt, 1990; Burris, 2000; 2001; 2005; Murray, 2014; 2017; 
Heerwig and Murray, 2018)25. The problem with this is that it is impossible to fully 
distinguish what portion of the findings of these studies is generalizable to other 
forms of corporate political activity. That is, if corporate networks are associated 
with increased donations, does this mean we can conclude that corporate networks 
are associated with increased political behavior in general and thus can be assumed 
to increase other specific forms of political behavior such as lobbying? To increase 
the robustness of our findings, we employ three different measures of corporate 
political activity: to the traditional measure of PAC donations we add lobbying 
expenditures and service on a Presidential commission. 
 
 PAC donations are measured in 2010 dollars and are the total amount of 
money given by all a corporations PACs directly to candidates for Congress during 
the 2009-2010 election cycle. Lobbying expenditures are measured in 2012 dollars 
and are the total amount of money spent on lobbying Congress in 2012. Both of 
these measures are clear organizational forms of political action and involve 
spending money to influence elections and elected candidates. To provide 
 
24 www.opensecrets.org  
25 The few exceptions are Dreiling, 2000; Dreiling and Darves, 2011; Banerjee and Murray, 2015; 
and Banerjee and Burroway, 2015.  
maximum robustness, our final measure is an individual form of political action 
transformed into an organizational measure. That is, advisory service on a 
Presidential commission is a dichotomous variable coded 1 if a corporation has at 
least one director who served on a Presidential commission in 2011. The idea here 
is to ask what type of organization has representatives advising the President, rather 
than asking what type of individual advises the President. Because of the duality of 
the network, the questions are related. That is, if inner circle members are more 
likely to serve on a commission, then companies with more inner circle members 
should be more likely to have one of them serve on a commission. Yet, if the type 
of director that advises the President is solely a function of individual level traits, 
then organizational variables should not be predictive. In some ways, then, this 
measure is also a test of our assumption of the duality of the corporate elite.  
 
 Political Similarity. Since an important part of our discussion has been not 
simply mobilization, but mobilization around consensus (in terms of both strategies 
and policy preferences), we also measure the similarity of corporate political 
activity. Our measure of political similarity is, unfortunately, less robust than our 
three measures of mobilization. In order to measure mobilization, one simply needs 
do document activity taking place. In order to measure similarity, however, one 
needs information on the content of political action. Out of our three measures of 
activity, only PAC donations contain information on the content of action. That is, 
not only do we know how much each corporation donated, but we know which 
candidates they donated to. With lobbying, we know what issues each company 
lobbied on, but not which side of the issue they fell on. Similarly, with government 
advisory service, we know which commission the company had a representative 
on, but not what advice was given. Thus, our measure of political similarity is one 
of PAC donation similarity. We employ a standard measure used in PAC literature, 
notably by Mizruchi (1989; 1992), where the number of common candidates that 
two corporations have in common is divided by the geometric mean of pair’s total 
number of candidates contributed to.  
 
 There are a couple potential issues with this measure, which Murray (2017: 
1630-36) identifies and proposes solutions to. First, corporations are known to 
target most of their money to incumbents, such that companies with different 
interests could give to the same candidate because he/she is the incumbent. One 
potential fix is to look only at races with no incumbents. Now, it is possible to make 
a strong argument that if corporate networks lead to adoption of pragmatic 
strategies that results in companies with opposing interests all giving to the same 
incumbents, then that is an example of corporate networks helping to unify the 
corporate elite. In this case, the fix of looking at open races is not needed. That said, 
in our data, there is no substantive difference to the findings for political similarity 
when looking at political similarity in all races or only in open races. The second 
issue, however, brings the issue of open race versus all races back into play.  
 
The second issue with our measure of political similarity is that it treats all 
dissimilarity the same. That is, case A: where one company gives to the Republican 
candidate in NY’s first district and another company gives to no one in that 
district’s race, is treated the same as case B: where one company gives to the 
Republican candidate in NY’s first district and another company gives to the 
Democratic candidate in the NY’s first district. Clearly case B represents less unity 
than case A, as it is direct opposition. Murray (2017) used a measure of unity that 
was calculated as the number of common candidates divided by the number of total 
number of common races, such that the reciprocal of unity is disunity (i.e., if two 
firms give to the same race and not the same candidate, they necessarily oppose one 
another). Using unity, whether in all races or open races does result in substantively 
different findings. We choose to report findings using similarity. The reason behind 
this is that for the 2010 election cycle, the mean unity score is .92. That means that 
the average pair of firms, if they gave to the same race, also gave to the same 
candidate 92% of the time. Compared Murray’s (2017: 1644) analysis of the 2006 
election cycle (when it was 71%), unity is much greater in our data. This creates a 
problem. With a mean of 92% (and 75% of cases have above 90% unity), there is 
very little variation to measure. Thus, we are not sure if the substantive differences 
are real differences in how mechanisms operate or if they are essentially just noise 
in the data. Our hunch is they are just noise resulting from the small variation (i.e., 
trying to predict the difference between giving to the same candidate 90% of the 
time vs. 94%). The reasons are 1) the findings for unity in this data do not match 
Murray (2017), but the findings for similarity generally do; and 2) the results for 
similarity match the results for all three measures of mobilization, while the unity 
results are different. Thus, the results of measuring similarity in this case are robust, 
while the unity results (with a lack of variation) are outliers. We choose to report 
and draw inferences from the robust findings. That said, the fact that unity is so 
high is a finding in itself. Almost all dissimilarity in corporate elite PAC donations 
in 2010 is indifference (you give to candidate A and I direct my money to a different 
race) rather than opposition (you give to candidate A and I give to her opponent).  
 
A consequence of our decision to use similarity, however, is that 
conclusions must be drawn with regard to similarity or consensus around strategies, 
rather than unity per se (a small, but worthwhile distinction). Table 4 shows 
descriptive statistics for our dependent variables. 
 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables 
 N Mean/Proportion St. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
PAC 
Donations 
500 $327,932 $594,389 0 $4,653,024 
Lobbying 
Expenditures 
500 $1,920,554 $3,226,453 0 $22,600,000 
Service on a 
Presidential 
Commission 
500 .21 .41 0 1 
Political 
Similarity 
57,970 
(dyads) 
.17 .13 0 1 
 
 
Predictor Variables 
 
 Inner Circle. Earlier, we discussed the ways that the inner circle creates a 
leading edge of highly mobilized and unified corporate political actors, 
demonstrated that the inner circle as a proportion of Fortune 500 directors has not 
declined, and also showed inner circle members are the most active in the PPN 
(which we also have proposed functions to mobilize cohesive political action). 
Thus, we hypothesize that inner circle members are still especially politically 
active and similar in their political preferences. This translates to organizational 
behavior through inner circle influence on corporate boards. We measure the 
potential influence of the inner circle on a corporate board as the number of inner 
circle members a given company has on its board. For dyads it is the geometric 
mean of the number of inner circle members each corporation in the pair has on 
its board. Directors are coded as inner circle if they sit on two or more Fortune 
500 boards.  
 
 H1: The number of inner circle members on a corporation’s board is 
positively associated with political mobilization. 
  
 H2: The geometric mean of the number of inner circle members on a pair 
of corporations’ boards is positively associated with political similarity.  
 
PPN. In our previous discussion of the PPN’s potential to mobilize political 
activity and bring cohesion to the corporate elite, we illustrated the ways the PPN 
can mimic the mechanisms found in the interlock network such as face to face 
communication across sectors or ability to sanction deviant behavior. While these 
mechanisms are related to the inner circle and centrality in the network in the case 
of board interlocks, the PPN is unique, in that it is made up of three different types 
of organizations (foundations, think tanks, and policy discussion groups), rather 
than one (corporation). Each type of organization has a slightly different (if 
occasionally overlapping) role to play in the policy planning process. This creates 
a different mechanism than simple network centrality through which corporate 
behavior can come to reflect a broader set of class-wide interests. That is, while 
engaging with highly central PPN organizations places the corporation’s directors 
in a position to meet other elites face to face, benefit from the diffusion of 
information from many industries, and to develop a broad normative consensus, 
these things are also true of companies whose directors engage broadly with the 
PPN. For instance, having directors in leadership positions on foundations along 
with other corporate elites gives experience thinking about capital flows and the 
funding of the entire apparatus, while policy groups allow for contact with a broad 
range of views on problems facing the corporate elite, and think tank leadership 
gives one the experience of commissioning experts to come up with solutions that 
benefit the broadest range of industry interests. The corporation that engages all 
parts of the PPN will develop a broader more class-wide view of both problems and 
solutions than ones who engage only in a narrow aspect of the network. Thus, the 
mechanisms of mobilization and cohesion are related to both centrality in the PPN 
network and the breadth of a firm’s engagement with the network.  
 
Breadth is measured as the number of different types of PPN organizations 
a corporation has representatives engaging in. The different types of organization 
are foundation, policy discussion group, and think tank. Thus, the measure runs 
from 0-3, with 3s having the broadest participation. For dyads the measure is the 
geometric mean of the two firm’s PPN breadth.  
H3: the breadth of a corporation’s engagement with the PPN is positively 
associated with political mobilization. 
H4: the breadth of a corporate dyad’s engagement with the PPN in 
positively associated with political similarity.  
We measure centrality as the number of two-step ties (i.e., indirect 
interlocks) a corporation has to other Fortune 500 firms through common 
participation in the PPN. For dyads, this is measured as whether the two firms are 
tied to each other through common participation in the same PPN organization.  
 
H5: A corporation’s centrality in the PPN is positively associated with 
political mobilization 
 
H6: Corporate dyads that are tied through common participation in the PPN 
are more similar than unconnected dyads.  
 
Finally, we also have argued that the class-wide politics flowing from the PPN are 
backed by an ability to sanction corporate behavior that deviates from it. In the pre-
fractured board interlock network this role was played by the commercial banks 
that dominated the center of the network (Mintz and Schwartz, 1985). If, as we have 
argued, the PPN is the organizational vehicle of class-wide power, then we expect 
to find banks at the center of the network. Centrality in the PPN, in this case, is 
measured as indirect interlocks multiplied by breadth, such that it is a combination 
of the two aspects of the PPN predicted to mobilize class-wide political action. 
 
H7: Banks are overrepresented in the center of the PPN. 
 
 
 
Table 5 Descriptive Statistics for Predictor Variables 
 N Mean/Proportion St. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Inner Circle 500 3.91 2.89 0 17 
Geometric 
Mean Inner 
Circle 
57,970 3.53 2.27 0 12.49 
PPN 
Breadth 
500 1.08 .98 0 3 
Geometric 
Mean PPN 
Breadth 
57,970 .84 .88 0 3 
PPN 
Centrality 
500 111.26 132.31 0 501 
PPN 
interlock 
57,970 .24 .43 0 1 
 
 
Control Variables 
 
Capacity/Reputation. One of the constraining factors in corporate political 
action is the financial capacity a firm has for action. That is, regardless of class-
wide rationality or political mobilization, a company needs money available in 
order to direct some to campaign donations and/or lobbying. We measure a firm’s 
financial capacity via revenue, measured in millions of dollars. For dyadic analysis 
the measure is the geometric mean of the dyad’s revenue. Finally, for service on a 
Presidential commission, the mechanisms through which revenue matters is not so 
much capacity to act, but the reputation afforded to very large corporations. The 
government is more likely to seek out advice from those associated with the largest 
most reputable firms, rather than smaller firms.  
 
Dependence on Government. Corporations that are uniquely dependent on 
the government, either for revenue through contracts or because their primary 
industry is heavily regulated, are likely to be especially politically active. This 
activity, however, is not due to some class-wide mobilization, but rather the type of 
narrow sectoral interest that is central to the fractured elite thesis. Dependence on 
government is measured in two different ways: 1) a dichotomous variable coded 1 
if the corporation’s primary industry is one of the top ten most heavily regulated 
according to the McLaughlin-Sherhouse List (Al-Ubaydli and McLaughlin, 
2014)26; and 2) a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the corporation’s primary 
industry is defense (the industry most heavily dependent on federal contracts). For 
dyadic analysis, both these dichotomous variables are transformed into new 
dichotomous variables that are coded 1 if both parts of the dyad are 1) heavily 
regulated; or 2) defense companies.  
 
Direct and Indirect Board Interlocks. Direct interlocks is only employed for 
the dyadic analysis. It is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the two firms share a 
director. Indirect interlocks is also only employed in the dyadic analysis. It is a 
dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the two firms are connected through having a 
direct interlock to a common third corporation.  
 
While the organizational side of the interlock network has declined, it is still 
possible that companies directly and indirectly tied to each other are similar in their 
political behavior. Controlling for direct and indirect interlocks allows a test of 
whether the predictor variables are facilitating similarity above and beyond what 
direct connections do. This is important, as the argument that those mechanisms 
have been able to stand in for the fallen interlock network requires that they 
function above and beyond more direct network ties.  
 
 Common Industry. Companies in the same primary industry will share 
many of the same economic and political interests. Even in a fractured elite, we 
would expect companies in the same industry to have similar political donation 
 
26 https://www.mercatus.org/publication/mclaughlin-sherouse-list-10-most-regulated-industries-
2014 
portfolios. Thus, it is important to control for this source of similarity. For the 
dyadic analysis, then, we employ a dichotomous variable coded 1 if both parts of 
the dyad are in the same primary industry.  
 
Table 6 Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables 
 N Mean/Proportion St. 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Revenue 
(millions) 
500 $19,526.96 $32,038.34 $4,161.8 $408,214 
Geometric 
Mean 
Revenue 
(millions) 
57,970 $17,155.72 $15,635.43 $4,184.79 $340,878.4 
Highly 
Regulated 
Industry 
500 .13 .34 0 1 
Both in 
Highly 
Regulated 
Industry 
57,970 .02 .15 0 1 
Defense 
Industry 
500 .04 .20 0 1 
Direct 
Board 
Interlock 
57,970 .01 .11 0 1 
Indirect 
Board 
Interlock 
57,970 .08 .26 0 1 
Common 
Industry 
57,970 .02 .14 0 1 
 
Analytic Strategy 
 
 With four different dependent variables, it is necessary to employ a number 
of analytic strategies. This sub-section is organized around the different strategies.  
 
 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression. PAC donations and lobbying 
expenditures are both count data, in that they are a count of the amount of money 
(smallest units being one cent) that companies spent on political action. That is, a 
company cannot spend less than zero, and they cannot spend fractions of a cent. 
Thus, even though the data can appear to be continuous because it is measured in 
millions of dollars, it is actually count data. Count data is highly skewed, making 
OLS regression less than ideal. The Poisson family of regressions, on the other 
hand, is ideal for analyzing count data because that sort of data tends to follow a 
Poisson distribution. Both lobbying and PAC donations, however, suffer from 
overdispersion. That is, their variance is much greater than their means. Since 
Poisson regression assumes that the mean and variance are equal, this requires the 
use of a negative binomial regression. The final issue with PAC donations and 
lobbying are that each has a significant proportion of zeroes (32.2% and 29% 
respectively). A Vuong test suggests that a zero-inflated model may be more 
appropriate than a normal negative binomial model. In addition, it is plausible that 
the combination of factors that determine whether a corporation donates money or 
lobbies at all, are different than the combination that determines how much they 
spend. That is, political mobilization is made up both of the decision to act, and a 
decision regarding the level of commitment to the action (whether that is the 
amount of time, money, risk, etc. depending on the political action being measured). 
A zero-inflated negative binomial (ZINB) allows me to model these processes 
differently.  
 
 Diagnostic tests for the two ZINB models suggests that both meet all 
additional assumptions of the regression. That is, multicollinearity between 
independent variables is not biasing any of the estimations, nor are influential 
outliers.  
 
 Logistic Regression. Service on a Presidential commission is a dichotomous 
variable. That is, a corporation either has one of its directors serving on a 
commission in 2011, or it doesn’t. This makes logistic regression an ideal way of 
estimating the model. One issue with logistic models is that they can yield 
unreliable estimates when one of the categories of the dependent variable is 
extremely rare. In this case, however, the category with the smallest proportion is 
service on a commission, which is .21. That is 21% of corporations have a director 
serving on a Presidential commission. This gives us more than enough statistical 
power to estimate our six independent variable model. 
 
 Diagnostic tests for the logistic regression suggest that multicollinearity 
between independent variables is not biasing any of the estimations, nor are 
influential outliers. Thus, all major assumptions of the model are met.  
 
 Quadratic Assignment Procedure Regression. In order to measure the 
concept of similarity, we use pairs of corporations (dyads) as the unit of 
observation. This way, all variables are relational measures between the two firms 
in a given dyad. The use of dyads, however, violates the assumption of 
independence of observations that is a foundation for most linear regression 
models. That is, because individual companies appear in multiple dyads (499 total 
pairs for each company), some observations will be more alike simply because half 
of the dyad is the same. This produces contemporaneous autocorrelation of the error 
structure and results in biased test statistics and P values.  
 
To correct for this violation, we use Quadratic Assignment Procedure 
(QAP). This technique is popular with scholars studying dyadic data (Murray, 
2017; Dreiling and Darves, 2011; Peoples, 2010; Burris, 2005; Mizruchi, 1992). 
QAP uses a regression model (in this case OLS) to estimate coefficients for each of 
the independent variables using the observed data. Then it randomly shuffles the 
row and column values of the DV, while holding the IV values constant, and re-
runs the regression-yielding new coefficients. This process is repeated (for this 
study, one thousand times) and results in an empirical distribution of expected 
coefficients. Then we can look at the percentage of the time the permuted 
coefficient is more extreme (larger for positive coefficients, smaller for negative) 
than the observed coefficient. These percentiles are substantively analogous to 
standard-error based tests of statistical significance (Dreiling and Draves, 2011). 
 
 Treatment Effects using Propensity Score Matching. Despite the ability of 
the above regression models to control for potential confounding variables, we 
cannot confidently assert causal relationships on the basis of the results. This is 
because the regression models only control for variables that are included in the 
model. Thus, it is possible that the results of these analyses are biased by 
unobserved and uncontrolled differences in political activity and similarity. 
Treatment effects using propensity score matching provide a robustness check on 
key findings that increases our confidence in making causal inferences.  
 
 The technique overcomes selection bias through the use of matched sample 
estimation, which controls for confounding factors by comparing observations that 
have similar propensities of presence of a key predictor variable (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983; Aral et al., 2009; Kim, Kogut, and Yang, 2015). That is, for predictor 
variables that the regression analyses identify as significant predictors, we derive a 
dichotomous measure of the independent variable (if it is not already in 
dichotomous form) and then use a logit regression to estimate the propensity for 
each corporation to fall in the treated group (i.e., be coded 1 on the dichotomous 
variable). These propensity scores are used to create a treated group (those coded  
  
as 1) and an untreated group (those coded 0), where both groups have the same 
mean for every other independent variable in our data. This is known as balancing. 
The idea is that when the two groups are balanced on everything we know, it is very 
likely they are also balanced on unobserved variables, making it possible to 
calculate the treatment effect (i.e., the effect of being in the “1” group vs. the “0” 
group). This aids in causal inference because if two groups only difference is in 
whether they receive treatment and the treatment doesn’t matter, then the outcome 
variable should also not be statistically different between the groups. If it does vary 
between groups, then it is the treatment that is necessarily causing it.  
 
 Diagnostics show that for the inner circle dummy variable, two cases violate 
the overlap assumption of treatment effects. That is, for these two cases (Exxon and 
Walmart), there was not enough overlap in propensities between them and the other 
498 corporations to allow for propensity score matching (or other forms of 
matching, such as nearest neighbor). For the inner circle variable, then, we run the 
analysis only on the 498 firms that have enough overlap. For the PPN variable, all 
500 cases are included in the analysis.  
 
 
Findings and Discussion 
 
In the argument we laid out in the front half of this paper, we hypothesized that the 
inner circle and the PPN can be used as maps of, essentially, class consciousness 
and political activism- with the inner circle and the most broadly engaged and 
central actors in the PPN reflecting the most class-wide political preferences. This 
is because, as we argued, the inner circle and PPN serve the same function that the 
board interlock network did (but perhaps no longer does): mobilize the corporate 
elite and facilitate the building of consensus around political strategies and policy 
preferences. Table 7 shows that the inner circle and PPN engagement are 
consistently associated with political mobilization, regardless of the measure of 
political activity. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7 Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Estimates of PAC donations and 
lobbying expenditures, and logit estimates of Presidential Advisory Service, 
2011 
 PAC donations Lobbying 
Expenditures  
Presidential 
Advisory 
Service 
Inner Circle Board 
Members 
.04* 
1.04 
(1.71) 
.05* 
1.05 
(2.33) 
.21*** 
1.23 
(4.38) 
PPN Breadth .33*** 
1.39 
(3.86) 
.37*** 
1.44 
(4.46) 
.35* 
1.43 
(2.15) 
PPN Centrality -.00 
.99 
(-.25) 
-.00 
.99 
(-.09) 
.00 
1.00 
(.96) 
Revenue .00*** 
1.00 
(4.44) 
.00*** 
1.00 
(3.46) 
-.00 
.99 
(-.20) 
Defense Industry .64** 
1.90 
(2.46) 
.71** 
2.04 
(2.76) 
1.03* 
2.80 
(2.15) 
Highly Regulated 
Industry 
 
-.08 
.92 
(-.50) 
.01 
1.01 
(.08) 
-.17 
.84 
(-.49) 
N 500 500 500 
Pseudo R2  .086 .254 .145 
Notes:  The first number is the unstandardized regression coefficient, the second number is 
incident rate ratio (PAC donations and Lobbying) or the odd ratio (advisory service), and the third 
number in parentheses is the Z-score. All probabilities are one-tailed.  
*indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01, and *** indicates p < .001  
 Capacity and dependence on government are positively associated with 
political mobilization, although the evidence is somewhat mixed. The control 
variable with the largest impact across all three measures is being in the defense 
industry. This reflects the importance of narrow sectoral interest in political action 
by the corporate elite. Controlling for these potentially confounding variables, 
however, we find that corporate networks are also positively associated with 
political mobilization.  
 
 For instance, the number of inner circle members a company has on its 
board is positively associated with political activity across all three measures 
(PACs: B=.04, P<.05; Lobbying: .05, P<.05; Advisory Service: B=.21, P<.001). 
Specifically, for every additional inner circle member, the corporation will increase 
its PAC donations by a factor of 1.04 and its lobbying expenditures by a factor of 
1.05, while the odds one of its directors will serve on a Presidential commission 
increases by a factor of 1.23. This supports H1: The number of inner circle members 
on a corporation’s board is positively associated with political mobilization.  
 
To get an idea of the impact of the inner circle on mobilization, it is useful 
to compare a maximum increase in inner circle members from a baseline of the 
average firm to the impact of being in the defense industry vs. being in another 
industry (since this is the maximum impact of the defense industry). The average 
Fortune 500 firm in our data is not a member of the defense industry, has about 4 
inner circle members on its board, donates $327,932 through its PAC, spends 
$1,920,554 on lobbying, and has a 21% chance of providing advisory service to the 
President. If everything remained constant except the company was a member of 
the defense industry, we would expect it to donate $623,070, spend $3,917,930 on 
lobbying, and have a 43% chance of having a director serve on a Presidential 
commission. If, on the other hand, the only thing changed about the average firm 
was to increase the number of inner circle members on the board from 4 to 17, we 
would expect $544,367 donated through its PAC, $3,629,847 spent on lobbying, 
and an 80% chance of providing advisory service to the President. The inner circle 
has around the same potential to mobilize the corporate elite as the narrow interest 
of maintaining defense contracts. Of course, the typical effect of the inner circle is 
much smaller (an increase of about $40k in donations, $230k in lobbying, and 12% 
in the chances of advisory service), but only 4% of companies are in the defense 
industry, while 90.8% of Fortune 500 corporations have at least one inner circle 
member on its board. Thus, the inner circle effect is much more broad and diffuse. 
 
Controlling for capacity, dependence on government, AND the influence of 
the inner circle, the breadth of a corporation’s engagement with the PPN is a 
positive and significant predictor of political activity (PACs: B=.33, P<.001; 
Lobbying: .37, P<.001; Advisory Service: B=.35, P<.05). This provides support for  
 
H3: the breadth of a corporation’s engagement with the PPN is positively 
associated with political mobilization. 
 
The average corporation has directors involved with only one type of PPN 
organization. If everything else about the average firm is held constant, but it now 
engages with the maximum of 3 types of PPN org (foundation, think tank, policy 
discussion group), we would expect $632,909 in PAC donations, $3,975,547 in 
lobbying expenditures, and a 35% chance of having a director serve on a 
Presidential commission. This demonstrates that the maximum effect on PPN 
breadth on an average firm is about the same as the maximum effect of the inner 
circle or of dependence on government contracts.  
 
While inner circle and the breadth of PPN engagement are positively 
associated with political mobilization, centrality in the PPN is not associated with 
any of the three measures. Thus, we find no support for H5: A corporation’s 
centrality in the PPN is positively associated with political mobilization. At first 
glance, this would suggest that corporations having direct channels of 
communication is not an important factor in mobilization. That is, the 
organizational board interlock network has declined and become less connective in 
terms of direct channels (i.e., sharing the same director or having directors sit on 
the same third board together). PPN centrality is measured as the number of direct 
ties a corporation has to other Fortune 500 companies through PPN orgs. If PPN 
centrality is not significant, while PPN breadth is, it suggests that connecting firms 
is not an important function of the PPN (as opposed to facilitation of class-wide 
rationality that results from broad engagement with different types of PPN orgs). 
This is a somewhat surprising finding given the assumed importance in corporate 
network and power structure literature of channels of communication between 
firms. A deeper look helps explain this null finding.  
 
If the inner circle variable is excluded from the above regressions, PPN 
centrality becomes positive and significant. Since PPN centrality is in no way 
thought to cause corporations to increase the number of inner circle members on its 
board, this does not suggest mediation. The null finding is accurate. What it does 
suggest, however, is that the PPN connecting companies to each other is not 
unimportant, but that the inner circle fulfills that function. That is, inner circle 
members connect corporations to each other both by sitting on multiple corporate 
boards and by serving together as leadership in the PPN. Thus, once the inner circle 
is accounted for, PPN centrality is no longer a significant predictor of political 
activity.  
 
Having established that the inner circle and the PPN both have a robust 
association with political mobilization, it is still possible that a very small 
percentage of the corporate elite actually has inner circle members on its board or 
engages with the PPN. If that is the case, then the magnitude of the effect of these 
factors on the elite as a whole would be small. Put differently, our overall argument 
depends on the inner circle and the PPN functioning to mobilize a leading edge of 
the corporate elite. Table 8 shows the expected levels of the different measures of 
political activity for an average27 Fortune 500 corporation at different levels of 
engagement with the inner circle and PPN. It also shows the percentage of the 
Fortune 500 that actually engage the inner circle and PPN at the specified level to 
give the reader an idea of how wide the combined effect of the inner circle and PPN 
reaches. 
 
Table 8 the Combined Effects of the Inner Circle and PPN Breadth 
 Percent of 
Fortune 500 
PAC 
donations 
Lobbying Chances of 
Presidential 
Advisory Service 
No inner circle 
or PPN orgs 
7.4% $201,643 $1,097,259 7.3% 
At least one 
inner circle and 
one PPN org 
64.4% $291,495 $1,659,055 12.2% 
At least 4 inner 
circle and one 
PPN org 
42.4% $327,932 $1,920,554 21% 
At least 4 inner 
circle and 3 
PPN orgs 
9.8% $634,631 $3,987,818 34.6% 
 
 The first thing to notice is the baseline political activity levels of an average 
corporation that is not engaged at all with the inner circle or PPN. Our first clue to 
the pervasiveness of these corporate networks is that only 7.4% of the Fortune 500 
actually do not engage with either network. Thus, 92.6% of the corporate elite have 
at least one inner circle member or are engaged with at least one type of PPN 
 
27 Average in terms of capacity (revenue), dependence on government (being highly regulated or a 
defense company), and PPN centrality 
organization. Nearly two-thirds of the Fortune 500, however, engage the inner 
circle and the PPN. The combined effect of these two factors on corporate political 
activity is not small- about $90k in donations, $600K in lobbying, and an additional 
5% chance of Presidential advisory service- and the fact that it is relatively 
pervasive supports the view that the inner circle and PPN could mobilize the elite 
in lieu of a densely connected organizational interlock network. Finally, the fact 
that nearly 10% of the corporate elite actually engage at very high levels (maximum 
breadth while also having 4 inner circle members) demonstrates the manner in 
which these factors can create a leading edge of corporate political activity. At this 
level of elite engagement with the inner circle and the PPN, corporations give 
around 3 times as much PAC donations, about 3.5 times as much spent on lobbying, 
and have almost 5 times the chances of service on a Presidential commission, as 
compared to the least engaged firms. So, while most corporate elite organizations 
engage at least somewhat with the inner circle and PPN, and this is associated with 
increased political activity, a smaller core of the elite are highly engaged and their 
political activity increases to the point of serving as a leading edge of political 
activity. 
 
 Of course, the most important question regarding the above effects is 
whether they are likely to be causal effects or simply associations. That is, does 
having inner circle members on one’s board and having directors engage the PPN 
actually increase the political activity of the corporation, or are all of these proxies 
for some unmeasured factor that explains political mobilization? Table 9 shows the 
results of treatment-effects analysis. 
 
Table 9 Treatment Effects using Propensity Score Matching Analysis of 
Corporate Political Activity 
 PAC donations Lobbying 
Expenditures 
Presidential 
Advisory Service 
Inner Circle (1= 
at least one 
inner circle 
member on the 
board) 
$189,568.40** 
$59,876.16 
(3.17) 
$678,487.90 
$456,642.60 
(1.49) 
.21*** 
.02 
(10.58) 
PPN Breadth 
(1= 2+ org 
types) 
$121,883.80* 
$64,798.46 
(1.88) 
$1,115,563.00** 
$460,655.20 
(2.42) 
.03 
.05 
(.51) 
Notes:  The first number is the average treatment effect (ATE), the second number is the standard 
error of the ATE, and the third number in parentheses is the Z-score. All probabilities are one-
tailed.  
*indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01, and *** indicates p < .001 
 Although the above results appear at first glance to be mixed, given that 1) 
treatment effects analysis is much more stringent about finding a significant 
association, and 2) the effects found in the regression analysis are linear, while in 
this analysis we artificially dichotomize them, the results are actually robust. For 
example, having at least one inner circle member on the board of directors increases 
PAC donations by nearly $200,000 and the chances of one of the company’s 
directors serving on a Presidential commission by 21%. While it does not seem to 
cause any significant variation in lobbying activity, it is worth noting that these 
effects are simply for the difference between no inner circle members and one. 
Whether having 4 inner circle members compared to none would have a causal 
effect on lobbying is likely but not something we can measure using this type of 
analysis. Thus, these results are a conservative estimate of the inner circle effect. 
Even so, having inner circle representation on the board results in increased 
political activity in two of three measures.  
 
 For PPN breadth, those that engage with more than one type of PPN 
organization donate around $120,000 more from their PACs and spend more than 
one million more on lobbying. The association between PPN breadth and advisory 
service is not significant here, suggesting that the association found in the logit 
regression may not be causal. Yet, the dichotomized PPN breadth measure is 
conservative in the same way the inner circle measure is. Thus, the null findings 
are worth noting, but they should not overshadow the fact that the associations 
found via regression analysis are supported as very likely causal for two out of three 
measures of political activity. The take-away is that we can be confident that the 
inner circle and the PPN play an important role mobilizing corporate elite political 
activity.  
 
The question that remains, however, is whether these factors also facilitate 
political consensus, such that political activity is mobilized around a similar set of 
strategies. Table 10 shows the results of a QAP regression analysis of the similarity 
of corporate elite dyad’s political donations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 10 OLS regression estimates of Fortune 500 dyadic political similarity, 
using QAP 
 PAC Donation Similarity 
Geometric Mean Inner Circle .006*** 
.104 
(1.00) 
Geometric Mean PPN Breadth .018*** 
.120 
(1.00) 
PPN Interlock .008 
.028 
(.81) 
Direct Board Interlock .009* 
.007 
(.98) 
Indirect Board Interlock .007* 
.015 
(.98) 
Geometric Mean Revenue .000*** 
.348 
(1.00) 
Both in Highly Regulated Industry .048*** 
.054 
(1.00) 
Common Industry 
 
.044*** 
.045 
(1.00) 
N 57,970 
Pseudo R2 .236 
Notes:  The first number is the unstandardized regression coefficient, the second number is the 
standardized regression coefficient, and the third number in parentheses is the QAP 
probability/percentiles of actual estimates in the null distribution. All probabilities are one-tailed.  
*indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01, and *** indicates p < .001 
  
 All the control variables are positive and significant predictors of political 
similarity, as expected. We want to briefly note that the findings for direct and 
indirect board interlocks may seem surprising, given the decline of the 
organizational side of the interlock network. It is possible that this finding is due to 
the interlock network’s decline not having as large an effect on its ability to 
generate similarity as previous research has suggested. It is also possible, however, 
that direct and indirect interlocks still produce similarity, but their class-wide effect 
is small because the number of interlocks has declined. This is, in fact, the reason 
we control for board interlock ties (as we mentioned in the methods section).  
 
Controlling for all of these other factors, the inner circle and PPN breadth 
are both positive and significant predictors of political similarity, providing support 
for hypotheses 2 and 4. In fact, the standardized beta coefficients show that, aside 
from revenue, PPN breadth has the largest association with similarity (followed by 
the inner circle). To get an idea of the magnitude of the association between 
similarity and the two predictor variables, let us first recall that similarity can be 
thought of as roughly analogous to the percentage of a dyad’s donations that go to 
the same candidate. A dyad that was average on every other measure, but neither 
firm engaged the PPN or had any inner circle members would be expected to give 
to the same candidate about 13% of the time. Earlier, we noted that 42% of the 
Fortune 500 have at least four inner circle members and engage with at least one 
PPN org (see table 8). 18,102 dyads (31% of dyads where both corporations gave 
to at least one candidate) meet those same minimum requirements, but they average 
5.9 inner circle members and 1.7 PPN orgs. For these firms, we would expect them 
to give to the same candidate about 19% of the time, a 46% increase in similarity 
compared to having no connection to the inner circle or PPN. There are two ways 
to view the magnitude of this effect: 1) within the context of the case (the case here 
being political donations), or 2) as a general effect. First, within the context of 
campaign finance, the inner circle/PPN effect amounts to about four extra 
candidates in common per dyad. But, the effect is felt by 18,102 dyads, which 
means 72,408 donations that are in common that wouldn’t have been. One way to 
think about that is that under condition 1, the dyad has zero connection to the inner 
circle or PPN: firm A gives to candidate Z, and firm B does not. Under condition 
2, the dyad averages 4 inner circle members and one type of PPN org: both firm A 
and firm B give to candidate Z. The additional candidate in common for this dyad 
is equal to an additional donation for candidate Z. Since there are 72,408 extra 
donations in common as a result of the inner circle/PPN effect we are illustrating, 
and the Fortune 500 gave to a total of 894 candidates, we could deduce that each 
candidate saw about 80 extra donations as a result of corporate networks. As table 
8 shows, the firms that have at least 4 inner circle members and connect to one type 
of PPN org would be expected to give about $328,000 total (assuming they were 
average on everything else). In these 18,102 dyads, the firms give to about 90 
candidates each. So, we can say they give about $3,644 to each candidate. The 80 
extra donations, then, amount to nearly $300,000 extra raised by a candidate just as 
a result of the corporate similarity generated by the inner circle and PPN breadth. 
Within the context of campaign finance, these effects are not small. If these 
donations are on behalf of class-wide interests, those interests should loom large 
for political candidates just based off of campaign finance.  
 
A second way to think about the magnitude of the effect is as a general 
effect. That for nearly half the corporate elite, the inner circle and PPN will increase 
its political similarity by about 46%. For example, let’s say that the baseline for an 
average Fortune 500 firm is to lobby on the same side of an issue as another firm 
about half the time. An increase in similarity of 46% would see them lobby together 
75% of the time. We could imagine this in any scenario, from the percent of times 
that corporate representative in media take the same side of an issue, to the process 
of building consensus in a policy discussion group meeting. The more connected 
elites are to the inner circle and the PPN, the more similar they will be in political 
action. The generalizability of this effect is unknown because we are only 
measuring in one context (political donations). Yet, the idea that it is widely 
generalizable is made more plausible by the robustness of the political mobilization 
findings across three different types of political activity. If similar processes 
mobilize corporate elites in the context of campaign finance, lobbying, and 
government advisory service, it is plausible to believe the same processes that 
generate political similarity in campaign finance also apply to other political 
activities.  
 
As with political mobilization, this discussion is based on the assumption 
that the associations identified by regression analysis are causal in nature. As 
before, we conduct an additional treatment effects analysis as a stronger test of this 
assumption. Table 11 reports the results.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 Treatment Effects using Propensity Score Matching Analysis of 
Corporate PAC Donation Similarity28 
 Political Similarity 
Inner Circle (1= at 
least one inner circle 
member on the 
board) 
.009** 
.003 
(2.69) 
PPN Breadth (1= 2+ 
org types) 
.077*** 
.018 
(4.25) 
Notes:  The first number is the average treatment effect (ATE), the second number is the standard 
error of the ATE, and the third number in parentheses is the Z-score. All probabilities are one-
tailed.  
*indicates p < .05, ** indicates p < .01, and *** indicates p < .001 
 
 Both inner circle and PPN breadth are positive and significant predictors of 
similarity. The magnitude of the treatment effect for inner circle is small (just less 
than a .01 difference in similarity), but as noted in the prior discussion of treatment 
effects analysis of political mobilization, the dichotomous measure of inner circle 
produces a conservative estimate of the magnitude of the effect.  
 
 PPN breadth, on the other hand, has a large treatment effect. The regression 
analysis suggested that the effect of having four inner circle members and engaging 
with one PPN org was an increase of .06 in similarity (for an average firm that is 
going from .13 to .19). The treatment effect of engaging broadly with the PPN (2 
or more types of orgs) is a .077 increase. That is, when all else is equal, a dyad 
whose corporations are broadly engaged with the PPN will give to the same 
candidates nearly 8% of the time more than dyads that are not broadly engaged with 
the PPN, which for an average dyad represents a 61% increase.  
 
 The results of the treatment effects analysis are in line with the regression 
analysis, which provides further support for viewing the association between inner 
circle/PPN breadth and political similarity as causal in nature. That is, adding inner 
circle members and directors, who collectively, engage broadly with the PPN, 
 
28 full balance was not achieved- bigger companies were more likely to be in the treated group. 
The standardized differences, however, were well within the suggested range of 10 to 25 percent 
(Austin 2009; Stuart, Lee, and Lacy, 2013; Garrido et al., 2014) 
 
causes the political actions and strategies of the company to become more similar 
to other companies that also have these types of board members. Since neither of 
these measures is one of direct network connection (and in fact the regression 
analyses control for direct connections), these findings are not likely the result of 
dyadic communication. That is, the two companies don’t become similar because 
they have the same directors or because they engage with the same PPN orgs. The 
mechanism of similarity here is likely the development of what Useem (1984: 115) 
calls class-wide rationality. We previously elaborated on the relationship between 
class-wide rationality and the inner circle and PPN, but to recap: inner circle 
members develop a class-wide rationality through their experience directing 
corporations in different economic sectors and their contact with other inner circle 
members (who hail from a range of sectors). Thus, the more inner circle members 
a company has on its board, the more its policies (especially political as Useem 
(1984:146-49) argues) are oriented around a class-wide understanding of corporate 
interests. Two firms that operate on a class-wide logic will be more similar than 
two firms that operate on a narrow firm-centric logic. Similarly, each type of 
organization in the PPN is engaged with a different aspect of shaping government 
policy. The more experience one has with the different aspects, the broader one’s 
view of politics and policy becomes. While it is rare for a single director to serve 
on many different types of PPN org, companies can have multiple directors who 
are engaged with the PPN. When their collective engagement is broad, they each 
bring what they learned in the PPN to the boardroom and collectively contribute to 
orienting policies around a more class-wide rationality.  
 
The final aspect needed to fully support our argument that the PPN has all 
the characteristics needed to function as the center of class-wide corporate power 
is the centrality of banks. That is, even if the PPN is the center of a class-wide 
perspective that is transmitted via the inner circle to the rest of the corporate elite, 
that perspective may not be adopted without the threat of sanctions imposed on 
those who go against class-wide interests. 
 
Table 12 shows the proportion of the Fortune 500, the top 25 most central 
companies in the interlock network, and the top 25 most central companies in the 
PPN made up by banks. Firms are coded as banks if they operate primarily in 
finance, i.e. depository institutions, non-depository credit institutions, securities 
and commodities services, and holdings and investments (We operationalized this 
as firms whose Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code begins with 60, 61, 
62, or 67). 
 
 
 
 Table 12 Percentage of Population Made up by Financial Corporations and 
Commercial Banks 
Type of 
Corporation 
Fortune 500 Top 25 Interlock 
Centrality 
Top 25 Policy 
Planning 
Centrality 
Non-Financial 92.8% 92.0% 80.0% 
Financial 7.2% 8.0% 20.0% 
N 500 25 25 
 
 Financial corporations make up roughly the same proportion of the center 
of the interlock network as they do the overall Fortune 500, reflecting the decline 
of bank interlock centrality that motivates much of the fractured elite thesis29. While 
banks only make up 7.2% of the Fortune 500, they make up 20% of the center of 
the PPN, and they are 2.5 times more likely to be in the center of the PPN as they 
are to be in the center of the interlock network. Overall, financial corporations are 
3.58 times more likely than non-financials to be in the center of the PPN, which 
supports H7. 
 
Not only are banks much more central in the PPN than the interlock 
network, the five banks at the center of the PPN are much bigger in terms of total 
assets than the two banks at the center of the interlock network. Table 13 shows the 
banks at the center of each network. 
 
Table 13 Financial Corporations in the Center of the Intercorporate and 
Combined Intercorporate/Policy Planning Networks 
Top 25 Intercorporate Centrality Top 25 Policy Planning Centrality 
Corporation Name Assets Corporation Name Assets 
Aon Corp $28.9 billion American Express $147.0 billion 
Northern Trust 
Corp. 
$76.0 billion BlackRock $177.9 billion 
 Citigroup $1.9 trillion 
JP Morgan Chase 
 
$2.1 trillion 
 Visa $32.2 billion 
Note: Asset data comes from company annual reports and LexisNexis Corporate 
Affiliations Database  
 
29 In 1962, 45% of the 20 most central companies were commercial banks (Mintz and Schwartz, 
1984: 157) 
 The average per company assets controlled by the five banks at the center 
of the PPN is $871 billion, while the two companies in the center of the interlock 
network control an average of $52 billion per firm. This means that the average 
bank in the center of the PPN controls the flow of nearly 17 times as much capital 
as the average bank at the center of the interlock network. Furthermore, there is 41 
times as much total assets controlled by the banks in the center of the PPN as the 
banks in the center of the interlock network.  
 
 Of course, the center of the PPN being 20% financial companies is still not 
as dominated by banks as the interlock network used to be. Nine out of the top 
twenty (45%) most central companies in the interlock network in 1962 were banks 
(Mintz and Schwartz, 1985: 157). As it turns out, six of the nine 1962 moneyed 
center banks are at the center of the PPN in 2011, they have just merged into two 
giant banks: JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup. Table 14 shows the merger and name 
change histories of the six 1962 banks still at the center of the PPN. 
 
Table 14 Merger and Name Change History of Banks in the Center of the 1962 
Network 
1962 
196
9 
197
6 
198
4 1992 
199
6 
199
8 
200
0 
200
4 
200
5 
200
7 
Morgan 
Guaran
ty Trust 
JP Morgan & Co  
JP Morgan Chase  
Chase Manhattan Bank 
Chase 
Manhattan 
Chemical Bank of NY 
Chemi
cal 
Bank 
Manufacturers Hanover 
Trust 
First 
Nationa
l Bank 
Chicag
o  
First Chicago Ban
k 
One 
First National 
City Bank  
Citicorp Citigroup  
Note: Merger and name change histories come from company Wikipedia pages. 
Morgan Guaranty Trust, Chase Manhattan, Chemical Bank of NY, 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust, and First National Bank Chicago all, by the year 
2000, had merged into JP Morgan Chase. First National City Bank, on the other 
hand, simply went through a number of name changes from Citibank to Citicorp, 
settling in 1998 on Citigroup. The fact that two-thirds of the most central banks in 
the 1962 interlock network are now represented in the center of the PPN by two 
banks that control $4 trillion in assets reflects 1) that the PPN is the current center 
of corporate class-wide politics, and 2) that banks are just as powerful as they 
ever were, and in fact, may be more powerful. Moving from six banks to two is a 
concentration of power, and concentrated power tends to be more influential, not 
less. 
The evidence presented in this section demonstrates that the PPN is a center 
of class-wide corporate politics and power. Although the board interlock network 
may no longer be a useful map for tracing and understanding corporate political 
actions, the PPN can be. The next section will demonstrate that the center of the 
PPN does in fact map onto corporate power by examining some revelations from 
Wikileaks regarding the Obama administration. 
 
Using the PPN as a Map of Corporate Power 
 
On October 6, 2008, Michael Froman sent an email to Barrack Obama with 
lists of Women, African American, Latino, Asian American, Native American, 
Arab/Muslim American, and Disabled American candidates for Cabinet/Deputy 
and Under/Assistant/Deputy Assistant Secretary level positions in the Obama 
administration30. A few weeks later, he sent an email to John Podesta (former Chief 
of Staff of Bill Clinton, who at the time was the co-chair of Obama’s transition 
team) with attached lists for all cabinet level positions31. Obama ended up naming 
almost his entire cabinet from the lists, which included suggestions of Robert Gates 
as Secretary of Defense, Eric Holder as Attorney General, Janet Napolitano as 
secretary of Homeland Security, Rahm Emanuel as White House Chief of Staff, 
Susan Rice as UN Ambassador, Arne Duncan as Secretary of Education, Kathleen 
Sebelius as secretary of Health and Human Services, Timothy Geithner as Treasury 
secretary, and Hillary Clinton as Secretary of State. 
 
These lists, while sent by Froman, were sent on behalf of a group, as he said 
the following to Obama in his email [emphasis mine]- “We have longer lists, but 
these are candidates whose names have been recommended by a number of sources 
for senior level jobs in a potential Administration.” This statement makes it clear 
 
30 https://wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/15560 
31 https://www.wikileaks.org/podesta-emails/emailid/53860 
that the list was generated in discussion with others and Froman is providing the 
results of those discussions.  
 
Who is Froman and who might the “we” he refers to be? There are two ways 
to look at this. The first is not informed by corporate networks. Under a viewpoint 
ignorant of the PPN, Michael Froman is nothing more than a friend of Barrack 
Obama’s who happens to be part of the political elite inside the Democratic Party. 
For instance, Froman and Obama went to Harvard Law School and worked at the 
Harvard Law Review together32. Froman also worked in the Clinton administration 
as chief of staff to Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin33. 
 
Robert Rubin, however, is Froman’s connection to another world. After the 
Clinton administration, Froman followed the former CEO of Goldman Sachs to 
their new home at Citigroup. Froman stayed at Citigroup until he joined the Obama 
administration in 2009. In fact, he sent the list of candidates to Obama from his 
Citigroup email address. If we use the PPN as a map of class-wide politics, this has 
extra significance, since Citigroup is one of the big banks at the center of the PPN 
right around this time. If we focus on this aspect of Froman, he is a representative 
of corporate class-wide interests and the “we” he refers to is probably other 
corporate elites central in the PPN.  
 
It is difficult to distinguish between the two potential understandings of 
Froman’s background and the truth is both probably played a role. That is, even if 
he is a representative of corporate class-wide interests, the reason he specifically is 
the representative to the Obama administration, rather than another corporate 
executive, is his college link to the President and his former position in the Clinton 
administration, making him known to Democratic political operatives like John 
Podesta and trusted by Obama.  
 
Nevertheless, if our map of corporate power is correct, then we should 
expect that Froman will go on to serve corporate elite interests within the 
administration. In fact, Michael Froman ended up becoming the United States 
Trade Representative and being primarily responsible for negotiating the TPP34. 
Not only was he the one helping to draft the controversial free trade agreement, a 
leaked Sony email reveals he was the point-man reaching out to the corporate elite 
for the Obama administration regarding TPP35. In an email sent to the Sony CEO, 
 
32 https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9500E5D81330F93AA25752C1A96E9C8B63 
33 https://today.law.harvard.edu/michael-froman-91-joins-white-house-in-joint-security-economic-
post/ 
34 http://www.salon.com/2014/02/18/obama_trade_officials_received_huge_bank_bonuses/ 
35 https://wikileaks.org/sony/emails/emailid/115052 
company executive Keith Weaver said, “It seems as though these negotiations are 
drawing to a close this year and the President/Froman want key industries saying 
positive things about the benefits.” This quote demonstrates that, at least from the 
corporate perspective, Froman’s role was to mobilize corporate elite support for the 
trade agreement.  
 
This case provides us with an excellent example of the power of using the 
PPN as a map of corporate power. If all we knew was that Obama’s new trade 
representative was a former high level executive at Citigroup, we would infer that 
because Citigroup is central in the PPN, Froman represents the global class interests 
of the corporate elite. We would expect that he has influence in the administration 
given his relationship to corporate power, and that he will advocate for policies that 
reduce the barriers to global trade. With the PPN as a map, Wikileaks is merely 
confirmatory, but in no way surprising. Without this map of power, we would only 
see an old friend of Obama’s and loyal Democrat who happens to have had a 
position at a big bank. We might expect him to take positions similar to those in the 
2008 DNC platform: advocate for main street rather than Wall Street, for labor and 
the environment rather than corporate interests. Without the PPN as a guide, we 
would have been wrong.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
A number of changes to the economy, such as financialization and the 
takeover wave of the 80s, led to two major changes in the interlocking directorate 
network: 1) the decline of banks from the center of the network, and 2) the reversal 
of the longstanding preference for outside directors who already sit on multiple 
boards (i.e., the inner circle). The result: “the interlock network is no longer a 
reliable map of elite power” (Chu and Davis, 2016: 750). In this article, we have 
demonstrated that the Policy Planning Network has all the characteristics to be a 
reliable map of elite power.  
 
 First, the actors that used to be central in the board interlock network- banks 
and inner circle members- are central in the PPN. Second, broad engagement with 
the PPN facilitates the mobilization of corporate political behavior around a similar 
set of strategies and goals. This is true not only when controlling for structural 
factors like capacity and narrow industry interests, but also controlling for the effect 
of inner circle members themselves. Thus, our analyses in this article provide 
support for a model of corporate elite political behavior where the PPN helps to 
foster class-wide rationality, which in turn facilitates the mobilization of the 
corporate elite around a similar set of political strategies and interests. This means 
that the leading edge of class-wide politics is found engaged with the PPN, and that 
the more centrally engaged an actor is with the PPN, the more politically active 
they are likely to be in pursuing class-wide interests. Thus, the PPN can be used as 
a map of class-wide politics and power, with actors unaffiliated with the PPN likely 
representing narrower interests than those associated with central PPN 
organizations. To illustrate this, we used the example of Obama Trade 
representative Michael Froman and his association with Citigroup (which is highly 
engaged in the PPN).  
 
 Our argument and findings have broad implications, both for corporate 
power structure research and a general understanding of politics. First, the existence 
of a highly mobilized and cohesive network of corporations that directly take part 
in the policy planning process challenges the notion of a fractured elite. The way 
the corporate elite that engage with the PPN act politically in no way reflects a 
group fractured by narrow interests. This forces us to consider policy outcomes that 
seem to go against the general public interest not as a byproduct of an ineffectual 
elite (Mizruchi, 2013), but as the intended outcome of an active and unified 
corporate class.  
 
 Second, our findings suggest a need for the type of systematic quantitative 
studies scholars subjected the interlock network to, to be replicated on the PPN. 
Scholars like Domhoff (2014) have provided the community of researchers with 
theory, data, and historical case studies related to the PPN, but we need to take the 
PPN much more seriously and build off of his work. That is, our findings support 
Chu and Davis (2016: 750) proclamation that “everything old is new again” and 
“Previously discovered “facts” need reconfirmation.” Do policy ideas spread 
through the PPN in the same way policies like golden parachutes spread through 
the interlock network? Are political actions such as lobbying or campaign donations 
more influential when they come from actors central in the network?  
 
 In addition, we should ask the historical question of when the PPN became 
central. Our analysis has focused on relatively current data. That matched with the 
fracturing thesis presents a picture of the PPN replacing the interlock network. It 
may be, however, that the PPN has always been an important center of corporate 
power. Domhoff’s analyses have always given primacy to the PPN and it is worth 
investigating the historical development of the PPN and interlock networks 
together.  
 
 Finally, the centrality of the PPN to corporate power should influence how 
we understand politics. We began this essay with the question of what are we to 
make of Donald Trump’s collection of corporate CEOs and billionaires as his main 
advisors and cabinet members? Take former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, for 
example. He was primarily tied through the interlock network only to Exxon-Mobil, 
where he was the CEO until he stepped down to assume his post in the Trump 
administration. A fractured elite analysis would predict a Tillerson-run State 
Department to be pro-fracking and drilling and anti-environmental regulations and 
treaties, none of which should come into conflict with Trump’s policy goals. This 
analysis would have trouble explaining, then, why Tillerson clashed with Trump 
over the administration’s opposition to TPP, their support for tariffs, and their 
denial of climate change and pulling out of the Paris Accord.  
 
If we use the PPN as a map corporate politics, however, Tillerson’s fate in 
the Trump administration is understandable. In addition to being the former CEO 
of Exxon, Tillerson was the Vice Chairman of the Business Council, on the 
Executive Committee of the Business Roundtable, and was a trustee at the think 
tank The Center for Strategic and International Studies. These ties to major policy 
discussion groups and corporate funded think tanks place Tillerson at the center of 
the PPN where he comes in contact with leaders from all sectors of the global 
economy, including representatives from JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup. If we 
move beyond the interlock network and treat the PPN as the center of the corporate 
power structure, then Tillerson becomes a representative of class-wide interests, 
rather than simply an agent of Exxon-Mobil and the petroleum industry. This means 
that in addition to being pro-fracking and drilling, Tillerson, like other class-
conscious corporate elites, will support free trade and taking non-binding actions 
against climate change that function to undercut the issue as a potential mobilizer 
of anti-corporate politics. Trump, on the other hand, although he was a billionaire 
businessman, never had any ties to the PPN. He represents a narrow capitalist 
politics, whereas Tillerson represented a broad class-wide politics. It is no surprise 
the two clashed.  
 
In fact, the PPN as map analysis tells us a similar process led to the 
dissolution of Trump’s council of economic advisors. Table 15 shows that the 
members were overwhelmingly tied to the PPN.  
 
Table 15 Donald Trump’s Economic Advisory Group’s ties to the Policy 
Planning Network 
Name (company) PPN Affiliations 
Paul Atkins (Patomak Global Partners)  
Mary Barra (General Motors) Business Council 
Toby Cosgrove (Cleveland Clinic)  
Jamie Dimon (JP Morgan Chase) Business Council, Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR), Trilateral 
Commission 
Larry Fink (BlackRock) CFR, Business Roundtable (BRT) 
Bob Iger (Disney) U.S.-China Business Council 
Rich Lesser (Boston Consulting 
Group) 
World Economic Forum (WEF), BRT 
Doug McMillion (Wal-Mart) U.S.-China Business Council, WEF, 
BRT (corporate membership of CFR) 
Jim McNerney (Boeing) Business Council, BRT, CFR 
Adebayo Ogunlesi (Global 
Infrastructure Partners) 
 
Ginni Rometty (IBM) CFR, BRT, Business Council 
Kevin Warsh Hoover Institute 
Mark Weinberger (EY) WEF, BRT 
Jack Welch (GE)  
Daniel Yergin (IHS) CFR, Brookings, US-Russia Business 
Council, National Petroleum Council 
Stephen A. Schwarzman (Blackstone) CFR, BRT, Business Council, WEF,  
 
The remaining economic elite cabinet members in the Trump 
administration tend to not have many ties to the PPN. Thus, while the 
administration’s policies tend to be pro-corporate and pro-rich, they often clash 
with the interests of the class as a whole. Power Structure research can help us 
understand politics better, but we have to use the correct map. The interlock 
network is no longer a reliable map, but the PPN is.  
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Appendix A 
 
PPN Organization 
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation 
American Enterprise Institute 
Arie and Ida Crown Memorial 
Aspen Institute 
Atlantic Council of the United States 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
Boston Foundation Inc. 
Brookings Institution 
Business Council 
Business Roundtable 
Carnegie Corporation of New York 
Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace 
Cato Institute 
Center for a New American Security 
Center for American Progress 
Center for Global Development 
Center for Strategic and International 
Studies 
Center for the National Interest 
Chamber of Commerce 
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation 
Committee for Economic Development 
Communities Foundation of Texas Inc. 
Conference Board 
Conrad N. Hilton Foundation 
Council on Foreign Relations 
Daniels Fund 
Doris Duke Charitable Foundation 
East West Institute 
Economic Policy Institute 
Ford Foundation 
Foreign Policy Research Institute 
Foundation For The Carolinas 
Foundation to Promote Open Society 
German Marshall Fund of the United 
States 
Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation 
Hall Family Foundation 
Heritage Foundation 
Hess Foundation Inc. 
Hoover Institution 
Houston Endowment Inc. 
Hudson Institute 
Institute for International Economics 
Inter-American Dialogue 
J. Paul Getty Trust 
James A Baker III Institute for Public 
Policy 
John S. and James L. Knight Foundation 
John Templeton Foundation 
Lilly Endowment Inc. 
Lumina Foundation 
Mercatus Center 
National Association of Manufacturers 
National Bureau of Economic Research 
New America Foundation 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change 
Public Welfare Foundation Inc. 
RAND Corporation 
Resources for the Future 
Robert W. Woodruff Foundation Inc. 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund Inc. 
Saban Family Foundation 
Silicon Valley Community Foundation 
Smith Richardson Foundation Inc. 
Surdna Foundation Inc. 
Suzanne M. Nora Johnson and David G. 
Johnson Foundation 
The Annie E. Casey Foundation 
The Anschutz Foundation 
The Bloomberg Family Foundation Inc. 
The California Endowment 
The Chicago Community Trust 
The Columbus Foundation and Affiliated 
Organizations (OH) 
The Commonwealth Fund 
The Community Foundation for Greater 
Atlanta 
The David and Lucile Packard Foundation 
The Duke Endowment 
The Edna McConnell Clark Foundation 
The Freedom Forum Inc. 
The Heinz Endowments 
The Henry Luce Foundation Inc. 
The James Irvine Foundation 
The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation 
The Joyce Foundation 
The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation 
Inc. 
The Michael and Susan Dell Foundation 
The New York Community Trust 
The Pittsburgh Foundation 
The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
The Rockefeller Foundation 
The Samuel Roberts Noble Foundation 
Inc. 
The Spencer Foundation 
The Wallace Foundation 
The William and Flora Hewlett 
Foundation 
Tulsa Community Foundation 
Urban Institute 
W. K. Kellogg Foundation 
Weingart Foundation 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for 
Scholars 
World Resources Institute 
 
